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13 January 1984

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ANGOLA

JOURNALIST TOURS SOUTHERN AREA, DESCRIBES MILITARY SITUATION

London AFRICA NOW in English Nov 83 pp 97-98

[Article by Richard Helmore: "Angola: Report From the Front"]

[Text]

In May last year South African planes bombed the town of Jamba in Huila province, killing seven people in a residential area and damaging both railway sidings and the power station. All the Austrian technicians working on the local iron mining restoration project and all but the most committed Portuguese left.

I recently spent a week in Jamba and found the project back in full swing, with 13 Austrians and 14 Portuguese *cooperantes* helping the Angolan state iron-mining firm Ferrangol get the mining and treatment works back into operation after it had been abandoned by the Portuguese in 1974.

The place seemed relaxed and the workers themselves reported a great improvement in security. Mine-laying and ambushes by South African-backed UNITA forces, common in 1981, are now rare. Peasants who in 1981 preferred to cultivate plots inside the town now farm outside.

I was able to travel at will in the surrounding countryside — for example to look at the 11 km conveyor belt which will soon be bringing iron ore from exploration sites to the treatment plant in Jamba. Security is undoubtedly tighter than it may appear, and since last year's bombardment steps have been taken to discourage South African planes from coming too near. There is no complacency and the large trenches close to both workplaces and homes indicate an awareness of the South African threat.

Most supplies for the Ferrangol project and the town itself come by road from the capital of Huila province, Lubango, 400 km away. I made the return journey on this road in civilian company without incident. Numerous round holes in the road remain from a time when the journey was not safe. A driver who had experienced both am-

bushes and mines in the past explained how in recent months the situation had improved.

We were to camp out for a night in the bush outside Lubango. After building a fire, we roasted a goat and listened to music till daybreak. It is unlikely that that kind of risk would have been taken if UNITA's previous claim to have shot down a MiG in the area had any substance.

Later, on I accompanied a group of Austrian, Portuguese and Angolan technicians on the 120 km of dirt road from Jamba to the sister iron complex at Tchamutete. On the way, we passed through the ruins of Cassinga. The shattered and pock-marked buildings mark the scene where in May 1978 over 600 Namibian refugees were massacred by South African troops and over a hundred taken to Namibia where they were still being held at Mariental.

After spending the night in Tchamutete, a member of the company's staff and myself set off by jeep for Cuvelai, 70 km further south in Cunene province, the last town on that route in Angolan hands before the South African-occupied zone. The sandy track has been the target of South African activity as recently as August this year. Wrecked vehicles by the roadside, many of them civilian, are testimony to operations conducted from the occupied zone just to the south.

There is evidence of a continuing military build-up of South African forces within the occupied area. Angolan military sources affirm that South Africa is building a large base at Ngiva, capital of Cunene province, and that the 1,000-metre bridge over the Cunene River is being rebuilt.

The Deputy Chief of Staff of FAPLA (Angolan armed forces), Lt-Col Ngongo, refers to the recent introduction into Cunene province by the South Africans of "three tactical groups, one in the Mupa

area, and two between Cuamato and Calueque." At the same time, another three were sent into neighbouring Kuando Kubango province, "one in the Luengue area, another south of Vila Nova de Armada and another south of Caiundo." The latter were to ensure the safety of fleeing UNITA survivors from their defeat at Cangamba when over 1,100 UNITA corpses were counted on August 10-11.

In Cuvelai itself, local government and party structures are operating and people carry on their day-to-day business. The town of Mupa, 54 km to the south, is occupied by South African forces, FAPLA's last position being somewhere in between. The occupied zone itself has no clear or rigid demarcation line. A number of centres such as Ngiva, Xangongo, Mupa, Evale, Namacunde, Chiede and Nehone are occupied, while South African, mercenary and UNITA units move around within the zone. There are frequent attempts to infiltrate north and extend the occupied area. Around the time I was in Cuvelai, the South African air force dropped napalm at Kiteve, near Mulondo, some 60 km due west, according to military sources.

While I was talking to the local commissioner in his office, a lorry-full of people arriving could be seen through the window. These, he explained, were refugees from the occupied zone. About a hundred arrive daily in Cuvelai, others in Mulondo and Cahama to the west. Many thousands will have arrived since the occupation began in August 1981. After registering in Cuvelai, they decide whether to go to join relatives in other parts of the country or to go to one of the refugee camps, long-established in Lubango and Matala to the north.

Most were women and children. Killings, torture, and lack of supplies and health facilities are given as the main reasons for flight. Those who escape the mobile groups of South African, mercenary and UNITA elements operating in the occupied zone are picked up south of Cuvelai.

For the various sabotage actions carried out by heli-transported South African troops on the Cuvelai-Tchamutete road against isolated vehicles earlier this year, the attacking forces continued to rely on air superiority. Detected on one occasion this year, a group was encircled and only secured escape by abandoning a quantity of war material, including a helicopter. In addition to FAPLA's improved defensive capability, it also sends its own small groups into the occupied zone to carry out guerrilla-style activities against occupying South African forces.

The resulting losses suffered by the occupying forces are a highly sensitive issue back in South Africa itself, where involvement in Angola is hushed up. Even when announced, losses are said to have occurred in "the operational area." There are special units whose sole function is the recovery, often in the heat of battle, of

South African bodies or destroyed equipment which, if left to fall into Angolan hands, would lead to embarrassment. South African losses are clearly much higher than commonly believed and would be more so but for the extensive use of UNITA and mercenary front troops.

On the evidence it is ludicrous to suggest, as Western press reports often do, that Angolan forces are unable to operate in rural areas, or that UNITA occupies two-thirds of the country. Some of the areas through which I drove have been shown as "UNITA-controlled" in some newspapers.

Similar claims in relation to UNITA's "tribal support" in the south are equally unsubstantiated. Huambo, Angola's second city and focal point of the heavily populated central highlands area, is claimed by UNITA propagandists to be a base of support for UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, on the premise that he, as an Umbundu-speaker, can count on the support of all Ovimbundu people.

I put this to my taxi driver during a brief visit to Huambo. "At the start in 1975 or 76, yes," he said, "it was only natural; Savimbi was an Umbundu. But now — look what they do! Killing when they want food — forcing people to their bush rallies. UNITA? — no, people don't want that."

The feelings of people in the south towards the various political forces they have experienced in recent years were illustrated by Maria Domingas, a local Umbundu-speaking woman from Jamba. "In 1974 FNLA and UNITA came and forced people to join. If you didn't have the right card there was trouble. First the FNLA threatened to kill my father if he refused to join. We ran away and hid in the fields. So they broke down the doors and stole everything. That made us very poor. Then came UNITA. They threatened to take us, the daughters, so my father sent us to Huambo. After this there was less danger; UNITA only wanted my father's daughters. When the MPLA came, at least some things were organised in the town and people could go to work in their fields again." Despite the difficulties of everyday life which such people face, their loyalties seem to hinge on their own experiences and judgement, rather than ethnic considerations.

While, with South African logistical support, UNITA groups continue their activities in the south and centre of the country, there has also been a stepping up of activity further north. The recent counter-offensive launched by FAPLA forces in many provinces indicates the seriousness with which the situation is being taken by the government. It is seen, however, as being indicative of the huge investment and careful long-term planning which South Africa, for its own ends, has put into UNITA, rather than the latter's innate capacity ●

CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

NEW PORT OPENS--Cape Verde's biggest economic project, the \$37.5m. shipyard on Sao Vicente Island, has been formally opened by President Aristides Pereira. It actually started operations in August, with the arrival of a ship for repairs. The facilities include drydocks and installations for carrying out repairs on floating vessels. The government hopes the new shipyard will help to make better use of Cape Verde's strategic position on trans-Atlantic runs. The shipyard is owned by local, Portuguese and Dutch interests. Finance was provided by the country's central bank, the African Development Bank and the European Investment Bank. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English 5 Dec 83 p 2833]

CSO: 3400/446

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

RELATIONS WITH SPAIN ON VERGE OF COLLAPSE

Madrid ABC in Spanish 25 Nov 83 p 13

[Article by Alberto Miguez]

[Text] There is not one red cent in the 1984 budgets. The relations between Spain and Equatorial Guinea are "on the verge of collapse" and Spanish cooperation with the ex-colony is going through a most unusual and difficult phase. Meanwhile, within the precincts of government, there are two opposing tendencies on the future of our presence in those lands and the means of keeping up cooperation with the former colony.

For several months the Spanish cooperators that are in that country have not been paid. Their living conditions have been reduced to prehistoric levels: for many of them, manioc, snails and muskrat have become their daily diet. Two physicians of the INSALUD had to be repatriated recently due to anemia. The stocks of the only supermarket devoted to our cooperators are almost exhausted. There is a shortage of antimalarial medicines and to get a kilo of meat requires taking a shotgun and going after something that moves. This is what had to be done by a delegation from the Bank of Spain that moved to Malabo to evaluate the amount of the Spanish debt.

Desperate Situation

The Ministry of Finance halted delivery of funds for cooperation with Equatorial Guinea after cutting them from 1.6 billion pesetas to 1 billion. The living conditions of our cooperators are unspeakable. This was also true until a short time ago of the living conditions of the 150 scholarship holders from Equatorial Guinea residing in Spain, whose scholarships had not been paid for months and who had to organize several demonstrations to assert their claims.

A series of very costly Spanish projects have been processed under conditions verging on scandal. For instance, the fuel tank for the port of Luba (formerly San Carlos), essential for the hypothetical presence of

Spanish shipping in those waters, has not been built, despite the fact that it has already cost 300 million pesetas. Matinsa, a company endorsed by the semi-official Focoex Company, 3 years ago unlead material theoretically worth 300 million, and immediately afterwards suspended payments. The material remained exposed to the elements for months until it became useless or disappeared. In Luba they are still waiting for their fuel tank.

Another matter verging on scandal is the famous water supply of Bata. The dubious engineering project located the tanks in a place where the water had to be lifted by means of pumps and which floods whenever a nearby dam (built by the PRC) releases its waters. Since in Equatorial Guinea there is a permanent shortage of diesel oil, the water supply does not work nor does it appear that it is going to work in the future.

Malabo is the only African capital--and perhaps the only capital in the world--which is without electric lights. The oil lamp takes the place of the electric light bulb, because the small electric generators, when they lack fuel, do not work or only work intermittently. The oil shortage has made this year's cacao harvest the smallest in the history of Equatorial Guinea in the 20th century: 5000 tons.

French Know-How

In spite of this fact, Guinean cacao--which is one of the best in the world--continues to attract the greedy: the ambassador of France in Malabo, Pierre Cornee, has just bought himself a fine ranch dedicated to raising cacao, in a symbolic gesture that announces other things. Because France will assume starting with the first months of 1984 the hegemony our country refused or did not know how to assume. Equatorial Guinea's entry into the Central African States Customs Union (UDEAC) and later into the BEAC (Central African States Bank), will turn Spain into a "third country," both in the financial as well as in the commercial spheres.

Between 7 and 12 December, two meetings between Spanish and Guinean officials will be held in Malabo. The first is to renegotiate the debt (over 40 million dollars) and the second, to design the "new, very constructive phase of cooperation," according to the official communique published after the visit of President Obiang to Madrid this summer. Nobody expects anything of these meetings, all the more so since nobody even on the highest level knows "what to do with Guinea." There are two conflicting opinions on the subject: the first, that of those who would put an end to Equatorial Guinea's drain both in the economic and political spheres, and second, that of those who are trying to sustain some modest, planned, controlled, humanitarian cooperation. Between these two factions there is an exchange of recriminations and not always printable epithets.

12448
CSO: 3448/4

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

COORDINATING JUNTA OF EXILED FORCES SUFFERS IN-FIGHTING

London AFRICA NOW in English No 32, Dec 83 p 18

[Article by Foday Fofanah: "Equatorial Guinea: Junta on the Rocks"]

[Text]

It appears that outside influence is taking a gradual hold of the seven-month-old Co-ordinating Junta of exiled forces opposed to the regime of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea. Recently, at a meeting in Zaragoza, Spain, the organisation kicked out its founding secretary-general, Francisco Ela Abeme, and replaced him with Ecube Medico who, until then, had presided over the Plans Committee.

Abeme was in no doubt that his sacking was orchestrated by interested parties in Spain opposed to his secretary-generalship. He told *Africa Now* exclusively: "On realising that I'm not the man they (the interested parties) are looking for, they lobbied and financed this meeting to get rid of me. That the motion did not appear on the agenda is an indication of manipulation.

"How is it that in a four-star hotel we paid only 2,000 pesetas a night for lodging and nothing for the hall where we met? This is the first time that such a thing has happened in the Junta. I'm fully convinced that the ruling Socialist government in Spain has financed this meeting."

The dismissal of Abeme, who is a lawyer and author of a recently published book, *Equatorial Guinea in recent years*, will undoubtedly force his supporters to quit the Junta. Originally, six different political groups made up the *Junta Coordinadora de Oposicion*. These were: *Movimiento de Libertad y Futuro de Guinea Ecuatorial* (MOLIFUGE); *Independientes*; *Frente de Liberacion de Guinea Ecuatorial* (FRELIGE); *Grupo para la Reforma Politica* (FRELIGE); and *Frente de Liberacion de Fernando Po* (FRELIFER); and *Alianza Nacional para la Reforma Democratico*.

Six months ago, the Junta lost FRELIFER when it was told it had no authority to discuss the autonomy of the islands of Fernando Po. Now Abeme's FRELIGE looks set to secede.

The main problem facing the Equatorial Guinean opposition in Spain is the lack of adequate financial resources to further its opposition to the Malabo regime. At the end of the recent meeting the Junta was undecided on which projects to place financial priority.

It was suggested that each of the groups within the Junta make a monthly contribution of 25,000 pesetas as a start, and that all Equatorial Guineans residing in Spain (about 12,000) should pay 1,000 pesetas each. The main issue is how to convince the average Equatorial Guinean exile that the cause is worth fighting for in the light of the recent rupture within the Junta.

But despite the in-fighting, the Junta is trying to prove that all is well. Just before the Zaragoza meeting, it issued a communiqué which called on the Equatorial Guinean Government to start urgent negotiations with the Junta with the aim of solving the country's problems. The communiqué hinted that the Junta would resort to violence.

Then after the meeting, out-going secretary-general Abeme told a news conference that there should be negotiations between the Junta and, this time, not only the government of Equatorial Guinea, but also those of Gabon, Nigeria, Cameroon, Morocco, Spain and France, as a means of achieving the normalisation of "the chaotic situation" in Equatorial Guinea.

This call came as no surprise because the first three African countries are Equatorial Guinea's neighbours and are hosts to thousands of Guinean refugees.

The government in Rabat, on the other hand, maintains troops in Malabo to look after the personal safety of President Obiang.

France is named for its part in trying to get Equatorial Guinea in the *Union d'Etats d'Afrique Centrale* (UDEAC) through the influence of Gabon which annexed the oil-rich islands of Cocoteros and Mbane as compensation for helping to bring down the regime of Macias in Malabo. Spain is mentioned because it was the former colonial power.

But the recently elected Socialist government in Madrid has not been falling head over heels to woo the Obiang regime. In fact Premier Felipe Gonzalez' government has cut down economic aid to Equatorial Guinea by 600m pesetas.

At the time of writing Madrid announced that it would no longer back the Equatorial Guinean currency, the ekuele, but would allow the country to become a member of UDEAC and enter the franc zone. In the same package, the Spanish Government is counting on the IMF to help re-negotiate a deficit of some 6bn pesetas.

The Spaniards hope that with IMF help, Equatorial Guinea's economy will be put on an even keel. Already there is an IMF team in Malabo checking the accounts, an exercise which will be carried out every three months until things begin to look good.

Meanwhile, Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Moran has asked Parliament (*Cortes*) for emergency financial assistance for Equatorial Guinea to take care of the deficit for 1983/84. But, until things turn out for the better, the current Spanish Government will not commit itself to draw up a new co-operation agreement with Equatorial Guinea •

CSO: 3400/449

GHANA

CUBAN LINK UNLIKELY TO FLOURISH WITHOUT SOVIET BACK-UP

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English Vol 24, 30 Nov 83 p 8

[Text] GHANA: CUBA, TSIKATA ET AL. The ruling provisional Defence Council (PNDC) pins much hope on Cuban solidarity and aid. Cuban cha cha cha dancers have been in Accra to pave the way, and 600 Ghanaian children have been dispatched to Havana to study. Cuban technical assistance, notably in rehabilitating the sugar plants at Asutuare and Komenda, is underway. Assistance in other fields is planned. But Cuban assistance is unlikely overall to be of much consequence, for three reasons:

- 1) When Jerry Rawlings took power again two years ago there was a predictable swing against the United States and Ghana's traditional bilateral west European relations. Libya almost immediately provided gratis 500,000 barrels of oil and sent successive posses of Libyan diplomats to Accra. However, the Libyan connection, while providing vital cash and oil during the crucial first few months of 1982, cannot produce the longer-term economic and technical assistance Ghana needs. This short-lived exuberance will probably apply to Cuba.
- 2) In March 1982 the then PNDC member, Chris Atim, led a delegation to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Cuba to set the tone for Ghana's foreign policy realignment. The Soviets offered a \$10m credit scheme to finance the rehabilitation of half-finished Soviet projects abandoned during the Nkrumah era. The Ghanaian civil service resisted the scheme. Six months after Atim fled to London where he has remained ever since. Nothing significant, other than the standard Soviet-third-party cultural and co-operation agreements, has materialised out of Moscow. Without significant Soviet involvement, the Cuban link is unlikely to flourish.
- 3) Under the guidance of foreign minister, Dr. Obed Asmoah, and, more importantly, the regime's special adviser on security matters, Kodjo Tsikata, Ghana's foreign policy appears vague. Tsikata, who remains the regime's No. 2, is a passionate admirer of Fidel Castro. Despite American fears that Castro might inveigel Rawlings to practice and preach communism, Ghana has now got a \$300m facility from the IMF. Western economic assistance, after waning with the shock of Rawlings' second-coming, is now set to increase following last week's World Bank-sponsored aid donors' conference in Paris. Oil exploration could become a major element to economic planning. The Cubans, without East German and Soviet back-up, are unlikely to graduate out of sugar.

Aware that the early 1982 chill in relations with western Europe could jeopardise vitally-needed economic assistance, the foreign ministry attempted to patch up relations. But the plan was beset with problems. In May 1982 financial stricture had influenced the closure of 13 Ghanaian embassies, including those in Denmark and the Netherlands. By the end of the year all its embassies in Scandinavia had shut down. Negotiations with France over mining development in Ghana did go ahead, but there was no follow-up to exploit French offers to assist agricultural development. Relations with West Germany were stretched virtually to snapping point after Tsikata's allegations of West German destabilisation of the regime.

On the African front a number of potentially rewarding relationships were left in abeyance. Algeria, whose independence war was strongly supported by Nkrumah, maintained until recently a full-fledged ambassador in Accra, while Ghana ran its Algiers embassy with a charge' d'affaires. The Algerian ambassador was then recalled for health reasons, leaving Ghana with only a thread of contact with Algiers. The closure, for financial reasons, of Ghanaian embassies in Benin, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Angola, Zaire, Zambia and Kenya, has not resulted in much lost opportunity. But bad relations with nearby West African states do have a serious economic impact, in particular the closure of Ghana's border with Togo, the traditional route for much of Ghana's land traffic. Nigeria, though it provides oil to Ghana on short-term credit, is regarded by Accra as a somewhat dubious partner because Nigeria harbours a number of anti-Rawlings Ghanaians, the same applies to Liberia and Ivory Coast.

The only friends the regime has in the region are Capt. Thomas Sankara in Upper Volta, Mathieu Kerekou in Benin and Col. Moussa Traore in Mali. Tsikata appears intent on keeping foreign affairs within his grasp.

CSO: 3400/449

GUINEA-BISSAU

COOPERATION AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH FRG

London WEST AFRICA in English 5 Dec 83 p 2852

[Text]

Relations between West Germany and Guinea Bissau have entered a new era. Until recently, Guinea Bissau refused to recognise the Berlin Clause which states that agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany also apply to West Berlin. This, therefore, made it impossible to sign a framework co-operation agreement which enables financial and technical co-operation to get under way. In 1982, German officials stated that Guinea Bissau adopted a more pragmatic approach and signed a framework co-operation agreement, recognising West Berlin, at the end of 1982. This agreement came into force on March 14, 1983.

In October talks were held in Bonn between representatives of the German ministry for economic co-operation and the Guinean secretary of state in the ministry of fisheries, Oliviera Sanca. West Germany has now agreed to provide DM9.25m. in aid to Guinea under the 1983 budget. A major part of the aid is designed to support the agricultural sector particularly small farmers in the southern province. A total of DM3.5m. has been set aside to provide commodity assistance (seeds, fertilisers, insecticides) to the farmers and over DM4m. will finance the provision of German experts to assist in the implementation of integrated rural development schemes in the same region. Assistance totalling DM1.2m. is also being given to provide spare parts and technical advice for the diesel power station in Bissau.

Under the food aid programme for 1983 Guinea Bissau will receive 1,000 tonnes of wheat.

LIBERIA

REFUGEE ISSUE STRAINS RELATIONS WITH SIERRA LEONE

London AFRICA NOW in English No 31, Nov 83 p 21

[Text]

The recent reconciliation between Sierra Leone's President Siaka Stevens and Liberian leader Samuel Doe may be short-lived if the former continues to adopt a negative attitude towards the problem of Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia (see *Africa Now*, July). Liberia cannot afford to care for them indefinitely and indications are that Stevens is not prepared to do anything about the situation.

As a matter of fact he does not regard the refugees worthy of his assistance, having referred to them as bandits afraid of their shadows. During the reconciliation talks, Stevens evaded the refugee issue although it was made clear that Doe wanted it settled there and then.

That the issue featured again in a Liberian radio broadcast barely two weeks after the talks, confirms the view that Doe is unhappy about Stevens' foot dragging. The broadcast, which critics feel was deliberately planned, was made on the eve of Doe's departure for the 38th session of the UN General Assembly, and it spoke of 4,000 refugees still in Liberia. The report said that the PRC government was encountering problems in caring for the refugees. The statement called on security forces to be more vigilant in ensuring that no more refugees escaped to Monrovia.

Indeed, one of Stevens' grievances has been Doe's continued use of the mass media, instead of diplomatic channels, in his efforts to have the issue resolved. Stevens feels such moves are deliberately planned to embarrass him. State house sources in Freetown have already referred to the recent broadcast as unfriendly and provocative.

Another issue that may affect the normalisation of relations is Sierra Leone's slow response to the feasibility studies report on the Mano River Basin Development Project. Although the Project may not be immediately useful to Sierra Leone, a negative approach to it may be interpreted by Liberia, which badly needs it to supplement its electricity supply, as unfriendly and anti-Union.

Having pumped millions of leones into the Bumbuna Project, which is in partial progress, Sierra Leone seems to have a genuine case in deciding against the Mano River Hydro Project — at least for the moment. Already groaning under the burden of foreign debts, the country is unlikely to contract fresh loans for a project with no immediate political or economic gains.

But diplomatic sources in Monrovia believe that the broadcast was designed either to arouse Stevens' interest in the plight of his countrymen in Liberia or to remind him that the PRC government cannot afford to continue to care for the refugees indefinitely — reconciliation notwithstanding.

Besides, the continued harassment of citizens on either side of the frontier since the border crisis imply that the recent reconciliation may be just window dressing, meant to facilitate a joint celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Union. The cracks are still visible.

The stepping up of border operations by Sierra Leone to check the alleged smuggling of cocoa, coffee, gold and diamonds to Liberia may not be taken kindly by Monrovia. These, coupled with some lingering hitches still on the diplomatic table, may make the realisation of real reconciliation a pipe dream ●

CSO: 3400/449

MOZAMBIQUE

GDR 'SOLIDARITY' SHIP BRINGS AID TO MAPUTO

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 30 Nov 83 p 1

[Text] The friendship and solidarity which unite the people of Mozambique and the GDR, which date back many years, were stressed yesterday in the ceremony to present the donation which arrived in Maputo last Sunday, aboard the GDR's "Ship of Solidarity" with our country. The ceremony, which took place in the port of Maputo, was attended by Jorge Rebelo, member of the FRELIMO Party Political Bureau, Domestic Trade Minister Aranda da Silva and Johannes Vogel, GDR ambassador to Mozambique, in addition to workers in this capital. The "Ship of Solidarity" carried the donation of clothing, fabrics, shoes, dishware and other consumer articles and products, valued at 500 million meticals.

The presentation ceremony was preceded by a performance of songs and dances by cultural groups in the city of Maputo, enthusiastically applauded by the audience, which completely filled one of the large warehouses in Zone D of the port.

The message presented by the people of Maputo on that occasion noted that "this gift represents the continuation of the relations of friendship and solidarity that have existed between our two peoples since the difficult times of the armed struggle for national liberation." The message added that the people of Maputo would put the donation to good use, strengthening the consumer cooperatives.

For his part, Ambassador Vogel noted that the gift is "a message of solidarity from the people of the GDR to the people of Mozambique." He also noted the fact that this is not the first time the GDR has supported the RPM [People's Republic of Mozambique] with concrete action. Every month, he said, the GDR sends Mozambique various donations for specific use, because our 'solidarity with Mozambique is part of the daily life of the citizens of the GDR.'

Later, Vogel said that solidarity between the GDR and the RPM is based, first of all, on common stands regarding the welfare of their people. This is why the GDR internationalists are working in Mozambique in all areas of activity. "We are attempting to implement the friendship and cooperation agreement signed 5 years ago, here in Maputo, by presidents Erich Honecker and Samora Machel," Vogel added.

Maj Gen Jorge Rebelo praised the crew of the "Ship of Solidarity" which brought the articles and products which our people need to Maputo. Congratulating the sailors, he praised the party, government and people of the GDR, because they sent the sailors who brought the donation.

Rebelo added that "the GDR comrades knew how to choose, from among the products they produce, the ones which we need the most." He said that the types and quantity of articles sent would help us solve some of the problems confronting us.

"In thanking you for the products, we are really thanking you for your solidarity," Rebelo said, adding: "When we speak of this donation, we are talking about all the help which the GDR has given us since before our independence." In a few words, he recalled the support which the people of the GDR gave during the Mozambican people's armed struggle for independence "and have continued to give following our independence. The GDR has understood our problems and has helped to alleviate them," he added.

Donation Will Be Distributed in Maputo

General Rebelo announced to the people of Maputo that the donation unloaded from the "Ship of Solidarity" will be distributed in that capital, by decision of the Mozambican chief of state.

He noted that most of the previous gifts have been sent primarily to other provinces, adding that the quantity of products now received "will enable us to solve some of our problems."

After praising Ambassador Johannes Vogel and his work in Mozambique, Rebelo announced that the diplomat will end his mission in our country within a few days, having worked here for about 6 years, promoting cooperation, friendship and solidarity between our two peoples. "We very much appreciate the work which he has done here in Mozambique," Rebelo said.

Concluding his address, the first secretary of the party in Mozambique appealed to the residents of the capital to be on guard not to allow the speculators to take advantage of the donated products when they are distributed. He noted that "in the holiday atmosphere, the speculators will be out in force, and only popular vigilance can neutralize their activity, not only vending the GDR-donated products but all kinds of other products as well."

The GDR "solidarity ship," named "Trenntec," arrived in Maputo last Sunday, with Capt Gerhard Gumprecht in command.

The GDR made other important donations to our country this year, including an important shipment worth 12 million meticals in support of the Fourth FRELIMO Party Congress. The shipment included fabric for decorations and to make banners, photographic paper and chemical products, among other items.

We should also mention the donation of several dozen tons of foodstuffs for CARBOMOC [Coal Company of Mozambique] in Moatize, 17,375 eyeglass frames for the Central Hospital of Maputo, water supply system material, cooking utensils,

material for 95 prefabricated buildings for the pegmatite project and clothing for children, students and workers. Also noteworthy were laboratory equipment for the UEM [Eduardo Mondlane University], 250 pieces of apparatus for physics experiments in the nation's schools and a large quantity of medicines.

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MOZAMBIQUE

LISBON SPECIAL REPORT ON COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Information Minister Speaks Up

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 7 Oct 83 "Especial/Mocambique" Suppl. pp II-III

[Text] "We are going to explain Mozambique in Portugal," O JORNAL was told by one of the members of the Mozambican government making up the party of President Samora Machel who is due to arrive in Lisbon today, Friday. Explaining Mozambique means explaining the "miracle of survival of a great country struck by serious adversity; explaining what the Westerners do not understand; explaining also that, at last, Washington must realize who the Mozambicans are and what they want and that cooperation with the United States is about to increase significantly."

Samora Machel comes to Europe and, in particular, to Portugal, (the longest stay of his European trip) with Mozambique's biggest government delegation.

The predominance of the ministries of economic affairs, of finances, and of the board of governors of the Bank of Mozambique, among the members of the Mozambican executive team who are coming to Lisbon with President Samora Machel, is in line with the vital concerns on the part of the visitor as regards talks with Portuguese authorities.

Mozambican National Resistance Means Death Penalty and Corporal Punishment

Beyond economic and financial cooperation, Mozambique also, once again, brings to Portugal its concern with the defense of its territorial integrity: Eliminating hunger among the Mozambicans and improving the defensive and military capacity--these are the two major concerns of authorities in Maputo.

Economic and military cooperation, however, as well as Portuguese financing in Mozambique will not be discussed in great detail in Lisbon. Samora Machel and his administration are more interested at this time to make sure that the Portuguese will understand with whom they are about to cooperate, that President Eanes and the executive branch under Mario Soares understand some of the problems and attitudes of Mozambique which the Westerners generally view through different eyes: For example, "Mozambican national resistance," the death penalty, public corporal punishment, and "operation production."

Saying that more than 70 persons have been executed by firing squad in Mozambique since 1979 (Amnesty International report), most of them for "political crimes," shocks Old Europe. Mozambique wishes to make it known that those 70 persons were materially responsible for the death of many Mozambicans and that the progress of the self-styled RNM (Mozambican National Resistance) can be sustained only by "drastic" measures such as the death penalty for serious crimes against the security of the state.

Reports and stories about RNM attrocities in provinces such as Inhambane, Sofala, Manica, Zambezia, and Nampula, of course can be turned over to the Portuguese authorities: But the reality of the facts--observed and described by the O JORNAL reporter in another part of this issue--are quite different from the "reality" of the "cause" for which the RNM says it is fighting, to anybody who wants to listen in Portugal.

The "Shock" of the Whippings

With the direct and clear language that characterizes him--which has influenced many ministers and provincial governors in Mozambique--Samora Machel is preparing himself to ask many questions in Portugal about the Portuguese and to reply to specific questions about Mozambique.

Why the public whippings, why all this corporal punishment? Since May of this year, Mozambican justice has revived a traditional practice which was a "law" in the old empire of Gaza (territory corresponding to the current Mozambican province of Gaza).

Jose Luis Cabaco, information minister and secretary of the FRELIMO Central Committee, told us: "It is my understanding and I even think that it is correct that a Westerner should be shocked over whippings since his set of values is quite different from ours. But, the thing that is suspicious is for a European 'to agree' with this practice."

The practice of public whippings as judicial punishment has been revived by virtue of the need for adapting justice and the social behavior of citizens to the real situation in Mozambique.

"Until a rather short time ago," we were told by Minister Jose Luis Cabaco, "we were governed by the Marcellist Criminal Code. Here is what happened: An individual would be arrested for robbery, rape, speculation; the man would spend some time in prison, he would sleep and eat, and, socially speaking, the punishment had no effect whatsoever: After getting out of prison, the individual in the end even boasted about his having been in prison."

Decline in Crime

For the citizen thus punished, public whippings imply the burden of social "disgrace" more than the harshness of bodily beatings.

Whippings are administered in public, before the population and representatives or members of the government and the justice department; the criminal is placed on a platform, belly down; the executor of the punishment then

administers the whipping with a kind of flexible truncheon, but only on the lower part of the body of the citizen to be punished.

Between 15 and 20 whippings is the most customary average punishment for speculation and black market activities; this kind of punishment can also be accompanied by imprisonment, by a fine, or by a stint in a re-education camp (for the more serious cases of robbery, rape, and prostitution).

The practice of public corporal punishment, as well as the removal of vagrants, unemployed, and unproductive individuals from the big cities to the rural areas--especially to the province of Niassa--is about to have important consequences in terms of reducing crime in urban areas.

In Maputo, you can walk the streets at any time of the day or night. It will likewise not be easy for a foreigner to be approached by a Mozambican with the suggestion that he exchange foreign currency on the "black market" and it will be even more difficult to cover up cases of corruption, in spite of the fact that black market activities have not yet been completely wiped out from daily life in Mozambique.

"Operation Production": A "Drastic" Measure

"Operation Production," like the whippings, was a drastic measure: Maputo and Beira, especially, but also Tete and Nampula, found that more and more people were coming in from the rural areas in search of an "easier" and more adventurous life in the cities. The situation deteriorated further due to the lack of food. During Mozambique's worst economic year ever (this year), the solution was to produce more and more--for better or worse.

In practice, the shipment of vagrants and unproductive persons from the big cities to the country's north, to communal villages and state farms or producer cooperatives, also brought about political control over them: They are being watched and "shepherded" by the local FRELIMO cells, in spite of the fact that they can move about freely in areas to which they are sent (some do escape).

Westerners find it shocking that a man from Maputo, in the south of Mozambique, should be swept up by "Operation Production" because he has no work permit or no ID card and they are shocked that he must leave his family and that he is "deported" to the North, several thousand kilometers away.

Putting an End to Tribalism and Regionalism

In the meantime, Mozambican authorities have assured us that this domestic movement, above and beyond the direct goals of increasing the output in the unpopulated rural areas, does have major political consequences.

Here is what Minister Jose Luis Cabaco told us: "Politically speaking, 'Operation Production' is the best practical way to eliminate tribalism and regionalism. National unity will be strengthened by the mixture of people, languages, and customs, from the country's south to the north."

National unity, nationalism, Africanism, active nonalignment--these are the main guidelines for Mozambique's domestic and foreign policy which will be explained in Portugal by Samora Machel's team.

"West Is about to 'Mozambicanize Itself'"

"It is not Mozambique that is about to become 'Westernized' but rather the West which is about to become 'Mozambicanized'" O JORNAL was told by the information minister and secretary of the FRELIMO Central Committee.

Today, Mozambicans as a matter of fact have much better relations with Western countries than they had several years ago. However, undeniable pride in national independence, in nonalignment, in nationalism, and in Africa has caused them not to admit "officially" what practice is about to demonstrate. Mozambique is explaining itself to the West because it wants to open itself up.

And the results are already visible, they are valid even in terms of the conversations which the Mozambican authorities are now going to have in Portugal. The United States at this time is greatly stepping up cooperation with Mozambique; the United States has opted for an intelligent form of "being" in southern Africa.

Washington Understands the "Miracle"

When the Americans recently asked the Mozambicans how they managed to survive recent years, Mozambique replied: With the support of the Soviet Union which supplies cereal crops, weapons, and automotive vehicles.

The blunt and clear attitude of the Mozambicans persuaded the Americans: Washington understands the Mozambican "miracle"; it understands that Mozambique "only" wants to be Mozambique, that the Soviets are not a "big threat" in a country that guards its independence so jealously, in a country that is so nationalist and so Africanist (options regarding which communists in both West and East obviously do not feel at ease).

United States Points to "Destabilization of Pretoria"

Early this year, in its "African Report," the United States State Department for the first time talked about destabilization by South Africa in southern Africa and from then on the term "destabilization," applied to the "apartheid" regime, has been used in stories and reports in the magazines THE ECONOMIST and NEWSWEEK.

During the tough period of national construction and destabilization by South Africa, Mozambique is facing a tremendous obstacle to the country's economic growth: Another stage that must be overcome with the sacrifice of the people.

"South Africa is our strategic enemy," we were told by Jose Luis Cabaco. "The armed bands (RNM) are the tactical enemy; the more dangerous one is the strategic enemy. We may have war at any moment."

Destruction of Economic Targets

In spite of the fact that it is more dangerous, South Africa, as the strategic enemy, maintains trade relations with Mozambique and its economic weight is making itself felt in the provinces of Maputo and Gaza, through lines of communication linking Johannesburg, Pretoria, the Transvaal, Natal, to the sea.

The tactical enemy, the "Mozambican National Resistance," in the country's middle portion is destroying production centers, economic and civilian targets, access roads leading from Zimbabwe to the sea, communal villages and farm production units.

So we ask: How is this possible? Mozambique has 3,500 kilometers of coastline --so where are the fish? It has banana plantations, so where are the bananas? It has excellent pasture land for cattle, so where is the meat and where is the milk? It has fertile land--where are the crops?

There have been various stages of survival in Mozambique and each one of them has been very difficult to get through. Some were more difficult than others and will be resolved only in the long run.

Here are the main adversities which at the same time explain the country's current condition of shortages and the heroic force of the Mozambican people in resisting them, without faltering, with the happiness of an independent people:

The economic structure inherited from colonialism (it suffices to take a look at the road map of Mozambique to find that colonial Mozambique existed by virtue of its dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa);

Out of 120,000 Mozambican miners who worked in South Africa (gold mines), only 40,000 still have their jobs as a result of South African restrictions on Mozambican emigration; how to find jobs for the remaining 80,000 miners;

To the benefit of what at that time was metropolitan Portugal, that country invested the profits from the gold paid out to the Mozambican miners (they were paid in gold during colonial times and the profits deriving from the interest went to the Bank of Portugal);

The attacks by what then was the regime of Ian Smith against Mozambique and the sanctions against Rhodesia: 580 million contos in direct damages to Mozambique (not counting the indirect damages, for example, the goods which the burned trucks and mined roads did not carry and failed to transport);

The undeclared war by South Africa (growing efforts by Mozambique to reduce its economic dependence on South Africa, less foreign exchange from South Africa);

Flooding of the Zambeze and the Limpopo;

Drought since 1979 (the worst of the century);

Attacks by the self-styled RNM (destruction of economic and civilian targets and lines of communication, murder and kidnapping of citizens).

Spartan Economic Policy

Against the background of this panorama of sacrifices and privations (there is real hunger in Mozambique), it seems "a miracle" that Mozambique survived. But the Mozambican "miracle" is nothing more than the practical implementation of a Spartan economic policy, based on holding imports down, increasing exports, maintaining a positive foreign exchange balance, and international price stability.

There is obviously inflation in Mozambique but the fact is that money is no longer in circulation because of the absence of goods to purchase. Almost all economic activities are aimed at exports.

The following strategic products are exported: almonds and cashew oil, sugar and molasses, shrimp, cotton, lumber, tea, cement and clinker, coking coal and burning coal, tantalum minerals, bagasse, citrus fruits, sisal, tires, textiles.

"Accumulating Wealth without Capitalist Exploitation"

Only a very small portion of all of these products remains in Mozambique for domestic consumption: The Mozambicans are sacrificing themselves by investing in the future. As Minister Jose Luis Cabaco put it, "The important thing is to accumulate wealth without using the method of exploitation of the worker through capitalism."

Accumulating wealth without capitalist exploitation is the basis of the understanding and the work with all of the countries of the world that want to cooperate with Mozambique. Portugal knows that but it has never been more important for the Mozambicans to say so in Lisbon so that even the Americans will understand the terms of the "contract."

Government Does Not Speak of "United States Imperialism"

Oddly enough, and contrary to the position of the authorities in Angola, the term "imperialism," directly associated with the United States of America, has been abolished in the official language of the Mozambican government in spite of the fact that, now and then, during indoctrination and political information programs, Radio Mozambique still emphasizes the expression "United States imperialism."

The information minister and FRELIMO Central Committee secretary explained this to us: "For us, imperialism has no homeland; it is above all a practice, a process. It so happens that this practice is pursued by the multinationals, most of which, quite by chance, have their headquarters in the United States. But we take great care not to confuse things: In our official party and

government documents, in our official position papers, we do not identify imperialism with the United States of America."

"Let Them Let Us Live Our Life"

In spite of obvious solidarity with the socialist countries and especially with the Eastern European countries, the Marxist-Leninist government of Mozambique is pursuing an effectively nonaligned practice in terms of security and world peace.

The objective and impartial treatment with which the Mozambican media reported the case of the South Korean aircraft that was shot down by Soviet fighter planes has been receiving positive comments in diplomatic circles in Maputo.

Prakash Ratilal, governor of the Bank of Mozambique, on board the comfortable DC-10 of the Mozambique Airlines, flying to Paris, from where he will continue to Washington, on the eve of returning to Portugal with President Samora Machel, told us:

"They asked us whether we wanted to adopt a position on the case of the downed aircraft. We had nothing to do with the case: Some say that it is the fault of the others and viceversa. What can we do? Let them let us live our life. Our problem is South Africa."

Jose Luis Cabaco: "FRELIMO Does Not Have Monolithic Leadership"

Major disagreements have become known between President Samora Machel and Defense Minister Armando Guebuza regarding aspects of security and military cooperation.

The current governor of the Province of Niassa, Sergio Vieira, and Armando Guebuza--both of whom are military men--have been seen by the foreign press in Mozambique as being members of the so-called "hard line" in FRELIMO.

"Are there 'lines' in FRELIMO?" we asked the information minister and secretary of the party's Central Committee in an informal conversation.

"FRELIMO does not have a monolithic leadership," said Jose Luis Cabaco. "The majority of the leaders have already made individual decisions and some of them may even have been wrong. But that does not mean that there are 'lines,' as an expression of organized tendencies."

In general, foreign journalists are accustomed to detect in FRELIMO a "sensitivity" which is more nationalist-Africanist (Samora Machel, Joaquim Chissano) and another one which is said to be pro-Soviet (Armando Guebuza, Sergio Vieira).

However, for quite a few newspapers that concentrate on the strongest personalities in FRELIMO, there are still contradictions in the definition of these "lines" or "sensitivities." For example, Sergio Vieira, whom many people consider to be pro-Soviet, seems to us to be much more pro-Ho-Chi-Minh and Maoist by virtue of his remarks (please read interview with O JORNAL in this supplement).

We must likewise not forget the significance, in FRELIMO and in the administration, of white leaders, most of whom have a Western technical education, men such as Jacinto Veloso (in effect the number-two man in the government hierarchy, minister for economic affairs in the office of the president); Rui Baltasar (minister of finance, graduate of Coimbra), Jose Luis Cabaco (minister of information).

"FRELIMO does not have a monolithic leadership." The reporter from O JORNAL was able to observe the correctness of this statement during a stay of a month and a half in Mozambique: Leaders and members of the administration discuss much, advocating personal opinions many times. But there is a strange kind of friendship among all. There is a noteworthy capacity for criticism and self-criticism.

This is why, as a single party, FRELIMO has little in common with the single parties in Eastern Europe and especially it has very little in common with the Portuguese Communist Party which seems to continue to understand not at all well what is really going on in Mozambique.

Pequenos Libombos Dam

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 7 Oct 83 "Especial/Mocambique" Suppl. p IV

[Text] The Pequenos Libombos Dam, 30 kilometers from Maputo, will significantly increase the water supply to the Mozambican capital and will permit the irrigation of about 17,000 hectares of land. The project, budgeted at \$100 million, was started in February of this year and should be completed by the end of 1986. This is a project which at the time was also studied by the Portuguese administration; after independence, the Mozambican authorities assigned priority and vital importance to it.

The growth of the city of Maputo in recent decades has rendered its water catchment and supply system insufficient among other things due to the absence of a local aquifer reservoir which would make it possible to cope with the long periods of drought that are so characteristic of the region. In view of the drought, which hit southern Africa in recent years, the question became even more pressing and problems deteriorated to the point where periodic increases in the water supply to the city became necessary.

A substantial water reserve will be created through the construction of the Pequenos Libombos dam on the Umbeluzi River; during its construction phase it will make it possible to regulate the flow rate in the river downstream from the dam so as to improve the water catchment and supply conditions for the capital.

The dam will also permit the development of the region through the previously mentioned irrigation plan.

This is an earthen dam with a length of about 1.5 kilometers and a maximum height of about 50 meters. It will have a concrete spillway in the center portion with a discharge capacity of 6,100 cubic meters per second. A dwelling unit, an access road, and other support facilities will also be built here.

The agency that owns the dam is the Water Power Development Management Unit, National Water Directorate, Ministry of Construction and Water, People's Republic of Mozambique.

The studies and the project itself are being handled by a Portuguese consultant firm and the civil engineering construction work is the responsibility of a consortium of Italian entrepreneurs. The supply of hydromechanical equipment is now in the negotiation phase with a Portuguese suppliers.

The cost of the project has been estimated at approximately \$100 million, to be financed mostly through Italian entities and, to a significantly lesser extent, by the African Development Bank and by domestic agencies under the provisions of the agreement between the Bank of Portugal and the Bank of Mozambique.

Cooperation between Europe, Africa, and Brazil

The technical assistance services involved in the project's analysis and approval and the project supervision aspect--financed by the African Development Bank and estimated at \$5 million--were awarded through international competitive bidding to the Portuguese-French-Brazilian consortium of enterprises consisting of the Portuguese enterprise OMAN [expansion unknown], Study and Projects Center, Limited; by the French enterprise Coyne et Bellier, Consultant Engineering Bureau; and by the Brazilian enterprise ENERIO [expansion unknown], Engineering and Consultant Work, S.A. [Incorporated].

In this consortium one can recognize its suitability in handling this undertaking; the Portuguese enterprise is playing a privileged role in the negotiations and the dialogue with the Mozambican entities as well as in the coordination of the other two foreign partners.

Profile of Niassa Province

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 7 Oct 83 "Especial/Mocambique" Suppl. pp VI-IX

[Text] Mozambique is bubbling.. But, as during the liberation struggle, it is the country's North which at this time is in the vanguard of this bubbling situation: Niassa, "the country's secure rear area," as we can read on a big map at the Lichinga Airport (the former Vila Cabral). Niassa is a fertile province and is 2.5 times bigger than Portugal with only a little more than half a million inhabitants. Niassa is where Mozambique starts all over again.

From the Mozambique Airlines "Boeing 737" I saw dense green jungle forests covering an enormous plain, bordered by beautiful Lake Niassa.

This was the first image of fertility and serenity which stayed with me in this vast province of Niassa where unproductive individuals and vagrants are being shipped from the big cities.

Turning Niassa into a Model

The protocol officer and secretary of Governor Sergio Vieira was waiting for me in Lichinga; he took me to the center of the tranquil and placid city with its broad avenues.

Along the road leading to the city, there are signs placed in the direction of traffic and greeting visitors with phrases such as "turning Niassa into an example and model in the struggle against underdevelopment."

I was put up in the Lichinga inn which had received orders to "clear out" its patrons because of the anticipated official visit of President Samora Machel to the province, accompanied by a delegation. But the visit did not materialize.

The city's motion picture theater, the ABC theater, a big, modern building, displayed posters for the (Soviet) film being shown, "Story of an Unknown Person."

I took a trip around the city. On the streets, there was not the slightest vestige of trash or dirt. Not only were there no lines in front of commercial establishments but one could also find clothing and fabrics that were not available in Maputo.

In a factory-made clothing store I saw khaki trousers for 1,305 and 1,610 meticals (in terms of Portuguese money, one must multiply by three), shirts for 1,075 and 1,185 meticals, travel bags for 680 and 1,540 meticals, and blouses for 2,517 meticals.

In a store next door, dishwasher detergent is sold at 150 meticals, clothes brushes for 57 meticals, hair tonic for 127 meticals, "Gureu" tea from Zambezia for 50 meticals per package, bottles of piripiri at 164, and dessert spoons at 10 meticals.

I purchased a dessert spoon which I will find very useful to eat some fruit preserves I had purchased in the French store in Maputo.

Only One Line for Ballpoint Pens and Magazines

The only line I saw in Lichinga was in front of the book and stationery store of the National Institute of Books and Records for the purchase of "Bic" ball-point pens and the magazine TEMPO which had just arrived.

The bookstore here has more books for sale than the bookstores in Maputo. Here I found some of the "out-of-stock" works from the collection "Autores

Mocambicanos" among the ever-present (but it seems unobtainable--something that can be determined by the few copies available) Lenin's "Selected Works."

Many children's books (domestic editions), political-educational books published by FRELIMO and the book "As Nossas Receitas" [Our Recipes] by the Organization of Mozambican Women complete the stock of works for sale in the bookstore.

Store for Provincial Managers

For the first time in Mozambique I saw bananas for sale in a kind of grocery store that also sold soap. In a store next door I found not only bananas but also eggplant, fish, rice, potatoes, toilet soap, and detergents. But nothing to buy.

When I tried to buy a kilogram of bananas, I was told in reply: "This store is only for provincial managers." I had to be satisfied with the smaller and green bananas in the store next door.

On arriving back at the hotel, I ran into a bit of excitement at the reception desk: A shipment of several boxes of "Opal" Bulgarian cigars had arrived by air. One cigar sells at 80 meticals (about 250 Portuguese escudos) and a box sells for 400.

On the next day, there was not much demand. "You only have Opal?" the walk-in customers asked after having arrived for lunch. "They are awful."

The hotel is the only place in the city where lunch is served for both hotel guests and walk-in patrons: Bread (available in large amounts) with sweet toranja spread and tea.

I went to bed early in the quiet hotel without any guests; my room faced the rear, toward an area where somebody was cooking out in the open with a big wood-fired stove. I fell asleep before lights out (every evening at 2200), listening to a little song by a hotel employee who was working the stove: "Long Live FRELIMO, Long Live FRELIMO, Long Live FRELIMO!"

City of Former Criminals

On the next day, after breakfast, I left for Unango, "the city of the future," recently inaugurated by Security Minister Mariano Matsinhe. Unango is an old re-education camp for criminals. The same is true today and rehabilitated individuals are building the new city.

There is no water in the hotel. An employee brought me a bucket and a bottle of the rationed liquid.

I found running water in Unango, at the foot of the mountain by the same name. This is water from the springs that irrigate the fertile plain in the district of Lichinga.

The local chief of protocol, a young man of 24 years, received me in the village which is the initial nucleus of Unango.

He took me to the "historical house," a big straw farm house where President Samora Machel met, on 22 October 1979, with the at that time 500 re-education trainees who had committed various common crimes such as robbery, consumption of and trafficking in drugs, illegal trading, rape, and even murder.

The house is "historical" because it was here that President Samora Machel granted amnesty to all of the re-education trainees of Unango, urging them to build a new life.

Starting All Over Again in Unango

Former criminals made a fresh start in Unango. They organized themselves, they established families, they built houses, they established agricultural and consumer cooperatives, and they developed one of the most interesting theories of experiences in the rehabilitation of criminals.

The young man who received me, the Unango protocol officer, confessed that he was arrested and taken to what then was the Unango re-education camp "in connection with questions of narcotics." He said: "I lived with my family close to the city of Inhambane. I was a college student and I took drugs. One day I was nabbed. They sent me to Unango. The time you stay in the camp depends on your behavior. Most of us behaved well. This explains the amnesty granted by our president. Since then I have never consumed any drugs."

Former Re-Education Trainees Supervise Former Unproductive Individuals

Some re-education trainees "left" Unango after amnesty. "Those of us who stayed," I was told by the young man who prefers not to identify himself, "are those who have an interest in and a desire for building the nation."

A residential neighborhood structure with three sections was created after amnesty with its blocks and respective chiefs and secretaries. The agricultural cooperative was established. Men were selected for construction work, such as carpenters and masons.

In organizational terms, Unango has an executive council with its own chairman (appointed from the outside, through the FRELIMO directorate), office and protocol chiefs who only take care of these functions in the future city.

But after the re-education experience of the criminals in Unango--without any prison bars--a new experience is about to take shape in the "city of the future" which has become a new center of attention.

About a month and a half ago, 250 unproductive individuals arrived from Maputo; they had been picked up as a part of "Operation Production." Their local supervision and agricultural training are handled by the former criminals.

"Get Yourself Another Woman in the New Place"

I met several former unproductive individuals in the fields of the Unango farm cooperative as they were building their own homes with lumber and straw.

Silvestre Josini, 28 years old, told me: "I have a wife and three sons. I was working on the railroad in Maputo. I had a statement from the manager to the effect that I was a good worker. But that was all. I was waiting for my travel permit in the district of Mavalane, in Maputo, when the patrol car arrived suddenly and I was put in it. I asked them to let them give my wife a check for 3,000 meticals but they would not let me do that. After I got into the wagon, I asked an officer: 'Where are we going? And what about my wife?' And he replied: 'Find yourself another woman in the place where you are going.' Well, I was headed for the prison in Machava. I was there for almost a week. And then they brought me here where I am working as a carpenter, building our homes. In Maputo I worked with containers on the railroad. In the district of Mavalane I had a house with two bedrooms and a living room and I had a chicken coop in the back. I left my wife 6 months pregnant. I am bored stiff. And all I was doing was waiting for my travel permit."

Generally speaking, during this initial phase, the unproductive individuals picked up by "Operation Production" do not feel happy in Niassa. I talked with several of them and none of them admitted that they had not been doing any work in Maputo.

Arnaldo Vilanculos, 37 years old, married, with two children, told me: "I was a fisherman in Maputo. I had no travel permit and no license. Most of the fishermen were self-employed. I do not know why I was brought here. All I know is that I would gladly return to Maputo."

Raul Macoa, an old FRELIMO fightingman, member of the farm cooperative's management and security chief for Unango, told me: "We ask all former unproductive individuals to tell us about their cases so as to correct any instances of injustice. But not even 100 out of the 250 have done so. And among those who responded, some said that they were busy, working, while others simply do not reply. There is a certain degree of confusion. Somebody from the Ministry of Justice should come here soon to analyze those cases. There are former unproductive individuals who do not even want to go back. They tell me: 'But what would I do in Maputo? How could I get along, eating just once a week? Here we eat every day!'"

No Hunger

There is no hunger in Unango. The farm cooperative is producing corn, beans, almonds (as an experiment), kale, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, cabbage, and lettuce.

The cooperative already has two irrigation dams, one of which was built in 15 days during the Fourth FRELIMO Congress this year with a capacity of 250,000 cubic meters of water. The other dam will be for fish farming.

"This must be the country's youngest agricultural enterprise which now begins its third harvest," I was told by the unit manager, agronomist-engineer Paulo Zucula.

The Unango agricultural enterprise is part of an integrated project (with social and productive investments and with agricultural, livestock, and vegetable sections) in cooperation with the GDR with a force of 200 workers (but now they will receive another 250, in other words, the former unproductive individuals).

"If we look at the economic aspect," says engineer Zucula, "the enterprise has more than enough workers for its size. But social and political aspects justify this number of workers. The work force came from various parts of the country. Politically speaking, this is a very important aspect to us. Mozambique is a country in a process of formation. The existence of several ethnic groups in Unango will produce greater heterogeneity: We have people from Cabo Delgado, from Gaza, Maputo, and Nampula. In the past there was no exchange between this province and the others. Niassa was a province at war. It is the province that has the greatest natural resources and it is also the province that is most backward in economic terms. Colonialism never invested anything in the south. The investments it made here were due to the war. On the other hand, Niassa and Cabo Delgado are two provinces with traditions of war, without food problems, where we rarely have any armed bands. They penetrate more in the South where the liberation struggle made itself felt less."

"Only Problems" Are Wage Differences

Niassa is gradually solving its problems and those of the country likewise: Providing food for the Center and the South. Unango is an outstanding example as to how the fertile land responds to the great feast of fertility with security, without attacks from the RNM, and with a capacity for initiative.

Problems in Unango? "The only problems we have here," says Paulo Zucula, "are the wage differences between the workers. The minimum wage is 2,100 meticals (about 7,000 Portuguese escudos). The average sometimes is around 3,000 meticals or so. Compared to the South and the Center of the country, these are good wages because there is no food shortage here and commodity prices for the cooperative workers are lower; A kilogram of potatoes here costs the workers 9 meticals (around 30 Portuguese escudos). In Maputo, it costs 13 and you cannot even get it. The commodities we do not have here include oil, soap, and sugar. But we are going to replace them: We are going to make oil on a crafts basis and we are going to replace sugar with honey. The honey will be better for the workers and for the market. We have energy problems but we are going to use wood chips to produce charcoal. The meat problem affects persons who come from the outside. The locals raise small animals and poultry at home. The enterprise is trying to solve this problem by promoting the raising of poultry, hogs, and fish."

Chekhov Unknown Here

Unango keeps growing. Unango will be "the city of the future." The foundations have already been laid. On land attached to the agricultural enterprise, they are already surveying roads and highways, a hospital, and a school; 20 houses will be ready by December.

The day is not long enough in Unango. It passes quickly. When I arrived in Lichinga, it was already night. I had dinner in the hotel and in the evening I went to the movies. I watched "Story of an Unknown," a rather bearable adaptation of a novel by Chekhov.

Behind me I heard Mozambicans whisper. One of them said to the other: "It would have been better if we had stayed in the lobby and listened to music."

In front of me, there were cooperants who spoke a Slavic language and applauded at the end of the movie.

When I arrived back at the hotel, the light was out. I went to bed by the light of a candle, without any water in the bathroom.

The next morning there was another trip through the effervescence of Niassa. I got into the "Land Rover" with a buddy from Radio Mozambique who was to interview farm officials. We went to Matama, a state production unit, riding on a long red-earth trail.

Corn, beans, potatoes, wheat, sunflower, garden vegetables, soybeans, and bananas are the enterprise's main products. In the field, workers could be seen picking sheaves of corn. Near a granary, a group was eating roasted corn and another one was preparing lunch, with corn flour, cassava, and wheat bread.

Passing an oven, I saw huge loaves of cheese that were to be smoked. I purchased five and ate two. I offered the others to the "Land Rover" driver.

Matama is one of the biggest agricultural enterprises in Niassa. It employs 1,200 workers and has now received more than 600 former unproductive individuals, including 60 women.

"I Never Had Any Work and I Never Liked Work"

The women, former unproductive individuals, seem more sincere than the men. I talked to some of them who did not hide their situation in Maputo.

Ricardina Augusta, 25, single, said: "I did not work in Maputo. I did nothing. I lived in my brother's home. I did nothing. I was picked up in my house. My husband was working. (Husband? 'Yes, husband, spouse, but not really official') and I stayed there. I have a daughter who also stayed there with my mother. But I am not happy to be here. Nothing...they have put me here to sift corn, something which I have never done before. How much do I make? I do not know, I have not yet begun to draw any pay."

Rosa Faijiane, 19, married "but not officially," one son, says: "In Maputo I worked in a pastry shop but I did not have a work card. My daughter stayed in her father's home. Since I am here, I might as well like it. But I am homesick for my district near the airport."

Angelina Jorge, 17, married but "not officially" with one son: "I did not work in Maputo, I did nothing. I was at home. I never worked and I do not like to work."

As for women with "unofficial" husbands, the Organization of Mozambican Women is urging them to contract a civil marriage, to legalize the marital status, for the defense of women. Otherwise they are often confused with "women of easy virtue."

Homesick for the Neon Lights

These women are now beginning a new life in Niassa. Some of them are not very much interested in returning to their "unofficial" husbands. They are having more trouble adjusting to the absence of the city environment, the lights, the neon signs, all the hustle and bustle, and the movies.

At the Matama state production unit, the formerly unproductive women are not assigned any heavy work. They spend the day sifting corn and some of them are kept busy grinding corn for food.

The unit has been existing here since 1976. According to Agostinho Reveia, the circle committee's (sic) secretary for ideological work, said: "The best agricultural years were 1979 and 1982" but "prospects are good for this year."

"Our main problem," he tells me, "is the shortage of bags. This is why we are not gathering more corn."

Chinese Work Hard

The agricultural unit has ten Chinese cooperants who work hard in the field as agronomist-engineers and mechanics, side by side with the peasants.

A Portuguese-style church, a vestige of colonial times, a primary school, and a health center are part of the social support facilities of the well-equipped state production unit at Matama. From Matama I traveled along endless trails to the communal village of Lussanhando, near Unango.

Lussanhando is a pretty and airy village with wide dirt streets where the children play happily.

Lussanhando: Red Earth

Paulino Imede, village party cell secretary, explained to me the difference between a "normal" village and a communal village:

"In a communal village, you have an agricultural cooperative and a consumer cooperative. In a communal village, everybody works as a team and in an ordinary village, everybody works for himself. We have no individual initiative here. But everybody is responsible for a production target (normally, 2 hectares per person during the farm season). Each collective worker is automatically a partner of the producer cooperatives; we produce corn, beans, sunflower, potatoes, and garden vegetables. The consumer cooperative takes care of the supply of daily necessities, such as sugar, soap, oil, clothing items, footwear, salt, and dried fish (no meat). We raise cattle (20 head of beef cattle) for breeding and for animal traction."

Party Cell

What is the role of the party cell in the village? Paulino Imede smiles. We were seated on a pile of corn.

"As leader of this village and the farm cooperative, I know all about cooperatives. I talk to the people about the ideas of the party and about sensitizing the population with respect to compliance with plans and the implementation of planning (what do we need at each point in time, what do we have to produce). The party cell has 27 members. The village consists of 240 families with 680 inhabitants. Now, with the former unproductive individuals, we have another 176 inhabitants (73 women and 103 men). The party cell has held meetings with the former unproductive individuals. Right now, they are cutting stakes and grass and they are surveying the fields for planting. Only four came with their wives."

We are not going to dramatize the situation. The African is not a Westerner. Wife or husband are not always the most important things in his life although it is important and it is a good thing to have a wife or a husband, even an "unofficial one."

Miscegenation Among Tribes

Many of the former unproductive individuals, as we said before, did not send for their wives or husbands because they did not want them. Others are beginning to marry the local inhabitants wherever they are sent.

In spite of everything, the former unproductive youngsters from Maputo confess that they cannot adjust to the people of Niassa: They do not wash--they tell us--and they talk a "funny" language.

Night fell over the village. Suddenly (African "mystery") I heard everywhere the thumping noise of the beetles in the thick mortar: A heavy, banging sound --the music you hear as you fall asleep in a village, standing pretty on red earth.

I also heard some songs. A choral group of former unproductive individuals greeted the visitors with "Makuaela" dances. The dancers were covered with red dust and they were singing in Rongo (the language of the South), urging people to work, singing to President Samora and "Operation Production."

Sewing by Candle Light

I took my leave of the villagers. I went looking for chief Paulino Imede. "He is in the shop," I was told by a tailor who was placidly making a suit on an old "Singer" sewing machine.

I entered the shop, the consumer cooperative. A group of persons was selecting fabrics by candle light. Paulino Imede got up, smiling as always.

The consumer cooperative manager offered me a big spoon made of a gourd. I was quite happy. And Paulino Imede smiled much because I was happy. He embraced me, he smiled once again, and got on his little dismantlable bicycle. He waved to us with his arm until our jeep disappeared in the red dust of Lussanhando.

On arriving at the hotel in Lichinga, I tried to take a bath but, "for a change," there was no water. I only washed my face which was red, the color of Lussanhando.

"This Here Is a Big Bore"

I had dinner, with fruit salad including papaya (where are the papaya plantations in Mozambique?) and I went to the movies again to pass the time. This time the movie was American and it was entitled "SOS Titanic." The Mozambicans like it and so did this reporter.

On the next day I left for Nampula and from Nampula I went to the magic world of the Island of Mozambique.

There was a small group of persons who had been evacuated from Maputo at the door of the hotel in Lichinga; they were waiting to have breakfast. They were youngsters with long haircuts, jeans, and dark glasses.

They had come from Maputo a few days ago. Now they were adjusting to the calm atmosphere in Lichinga.

The strongest of them, a fellow of Indian origin, with a good-hearted expression, said loudly: "This is a big bore here. There is nothing going on here. But I did find a couple of guitars and so, if you like, you can play."

Then came the music made by evacuated musicians.

"They Are Certainly Drugged"

Ricardo Dimande, a journalist, delegate of the provincial broadcasting station of Radio Mozambique in Lichina and local representative of the Ministry of Information, came looking for me at the hotel for a meeting with Niassa Governor Sergio Vieira.

He ran into the young musicians as he came to the hotel and told me: "What strange people they are. They are certainly drugged."

Vieira Explains 'Operation Production'

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 7 Oct 83 "Especial/Mocambique" Suppl. pp VI, VII

[Text] "One of the consequences of 'Operation Production' will be the development of Portuguese as a language of national unity," said Col Sergio Vieira, governor of Niassa, in Lichinga during an interview with O JORNAL; he also a former minister of agriculture and a former governor of the Bank of Mozambique. Considered to be one of the "hardliners" in FRELIMO, Sergio Vieira is one of the chief defenders and "ideologists" of "Operation Production" whose causes and political and cultural consequences he analyzes in this interview for O JORNAL.

Following the recent Fourth FRELIMO Congress, Col Sergio Vieira was transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the position of governor of Niassa. His agricultural background and the experience he gathered during the liberation struggle--in which he distinguished himself--enabled him, from Lichinga, to implement a new dynamic effort in the most rural of all Mozambican provinces.

This effervescence is noticed soon after the first contacts with the situation in Niassa. This effervescence is also and above all a product of a "phenomenon" called "Operation Production."

"We Want to Urbanize the Rural Areas"

Here is how Sergio Vieira explained "Operation Production" to us: "There is a first aspect which has to do with the development of our province: We constitute 16.5 percent of national territory and we only have 545,000 inhabitants. A correct exploitation of our resources would thus be impossible with so few people. This influx of people as a result of 'Operation Production' will enable us to have a little more in the way of social division of labor and, consequently, greater output.

"The second aspect of this operation is the materialization of national unity. It was easy to say 'Down with tribalism and racism.' Today the full complexity of Mozambique is reflected in Niassa.

"And here is the third aspect: We are going into a healthy confrontation which is a stimulus--it is the food habits of Niassa which will be confronted with the good or bad traditions of the other parts of the country. This will permit a significant variation in the diet. This entire impetus will be reflected in the quality of life in medium-range terms. In Niassa we can say that there is no large-scale hunger. We also want to make sure that there will be no lack of quality either. Culturally speaking there are new traditions which will broaden the province's cultural horizons.

"Here is the fourth aspect: Most of the former unproductive individuals came from urban areas and they harbor some negative and positive aspects. But our intention is to urbanize the rural areas and not to keep it in its primitive stage, in the same conservative attitude that is found in the rural areas in

the interior. We can thus already evaluate the positive aspects of 'Operation Production.'"

"A Growing Portuguese"

Urbanizing the rural areas--the very idea calls for a polemic. Sergio Vieira is a polemical person. When we asked him whether he did not think that, in long-range terms, native, original languages would disappear in Niassa, the governor replied calmly:

"All the languages that do not develop will die. The life of a language exists in the life of society. One of the consequences of 'Operation Production' on this level will be the development of Portuguese as the language of national unity. But what will that Portuguese be like several years from now? It will be a different, growing Portuguese, perhaps contrary to the desire of the purists.

"National unity will materialize in this fashion. This is a new stage in the formation of the Mozambican national which results from the combination of various factors: The colonial phenomenon; the liberation struggle under the direction of FRELIMO which created a community of historical identity; the mixture of people, of cultures, and of efforts. In the case of Mozambique, the nation is not being forged under the hegemony of feudalism and of capitalism but indeed under the hegemony of the working classes."

The "Non-Heritage" of Niassa

And what are the main difficulties in Niassa? Sergio Vieira paused with an ironic silence and then replied laconically: "The heritage."

Here is how he explained that: "Indirect colonialism developed in this province. Most of the territory of Niassa did not have the conventional colonial presence. We had a kind of indirect colonialism here which was implemented through the feudal landowners. We had districts where we never had any schools or hospitals. Most of the roads were built by us. Some districts did not have any. We built the schools and hospitals. Therefore, when I speak of 'heritage,' what we should actually say is non-heritage. But, even so, we still do not have a correct network of roads and lines of communication. At any rate, we have great prospects as far as minerals are concerned. There are no fishing activities here. While Malawi gets 50,000-60,000 tons of fish from the lake, we get nothing. The farms were operated only by the settlers. Before, Matama covered something like 100 hectares. The region's potential--soybeans, beans, wheat, potatoes, vegetables--were never developed. There was some cotton farming in the southern part of Niassa. We were quite inexperienced in livestock operations."

Deposits of Coal, Uranium, and Iron

Turning Niassa into a model, urbanizing the rural areas, as Sergio Vieira puts it, but turning the agricultural base into the main instrument for the province's development, making up for lost time but also investing in other areas of activity.

"We are about to create a hydroelectric network to establish small industries and, later on, the mining and processing industry. The fishing industry is a potential to be developed in medium-range terms. We have already located large deposits of coal, uranium, and iron and we are about to begin prospecting. We have an excellent base for a lumber industry, we have completed and we are now inaugurating the first hydroelectric dam which is already operating. We have a plan for a second dam in the southern part and we have planned another four dams for this 5-year term."

Although this development effort and this development dynamic in Niassa is not only the "work" of the current provincial governor (who has been in Lichinga since May of this year) it is certain that President Samora Machel was trying to select a "tough" man for this strategic job, a man with a "pulse of iron" (as he is known), capable of "putting things right" in a short time.

The "University of War"

Sergio Vieira, a colonel in the People's Armed Forces and a member of the FRELIMO Central Committee, a charismatic personality from the liberation struggle is considered a "revolutionary intellectual," a man who constantly derives "lessons" to be learned from the practical application of Marxism to the Mozambican reality, starting with new analyses of the phenomenon that is Mozambique.

"The only education I had," he told O JORNAL, "was the war, from the beginning, from 1962. The liberation war taught us much. Above all it taught us a correct methodology of work with the masses and with the effort to develop the working masses.

"The war told us how to overcome difficulties and how not to face them as insurmountable barriers. It taught us to channel the potential of an organized and determined people. In this sense, the war was a great university for my entire generation. But I do not mean to praise war with these words."

Sergio Vieira is governor of Niassa; he is a "hardliner" who is also a poet. "Tambem Memoria do Povo" [Also in Memory of the People] is the title of his first book to be published shortly in Mozambique and in Portugal, under the provisions of an agreement with the Portuguese Book Institute. It still talks about the "University of War," but it does not praise it.

Economic Survey

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 7 Oct 83 "Especial/Mocambique" Suppl., pp XI-XIII

[Text] With an economy essentially based on agriculture, Mozambique has made considerable progress in recent years. However, the economic situation continues to be weak due to dependence on the outside world and the deterioration of the terms of exchange. When Mozambique achieved independence in 1975, it needed to export 5,300 kilograms of cotton to purchase one truck. In 1981, to buy that same truck, it has to sell 12,900 kilograms.

The People's Republic of Mozambique covers an area of 783,030 square kilometers. It extends for a distance of 2,504 kilometers along the Indian Ocean and shares its international boundary with the following countries: Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Swaziland. The population of close to 10 million inhabitants makes for a population density of 12 inhabitants per square kilometer.

It is estimated that 43 percent of the population are under the age of 14; 54 percent are between the ages of 15 and 64; only 3 percent are over the age of 65 which leads to the conclusion that this is a young population. However, the life expectancy does not exceed 46 years.

Balance of Trade between the People's Republic of Mozambique and Portugal

	(1,000 contos)			
	1980	1981	1982(1)	1983(2)
Exports	1,100.7	1,033.6	1,122.5	448.7
Imports	1,860.0	2,065.9	5,391.7	3,081.3
Balance	-759.3	-1,032.3	-4,269.2	-2,632.6
Coverage rate (%)	59.2	50.0	20.8	14.6

Source: Foreign Trade Statistics, INE [National Statistics Institute]; (1) Provisional figures; (2) Figures as of the first half of 1983.

In 1976, after the departure of non-African medical personnel, the country had 100 doctors (in other words, one doctor for every 90,000 inhabitants) and 989 hospitals with 13,102 beds (one bed for every 549 inhabitants). The National Health Service was created to correct this situation; it had the cooperation of European and Tanzanian personnel who emphasized mostly preventive medicine and the fight against the big endemic disease, such as tuberculosis, intestinal infections, pneumonia, measles, and hepatitis. Between 1977 and 1982, national expenditures on health grew 61 percent, in other words, an average annual increase on the order of 10 percent, which is quite significant.

Regarding education, the illiteracy rate among the population over the age of 7 dropped from 93 percent in 1975 to 73 percent in 1980. Current education expenditures account for about 20 percent of the government budget.

In 1978, the per-capita GNP was \$140, putting the country in 88th place worldwide.

Dependent Economy

The agricultural sector is the basis of the Mozambican economy. It suffices to say that 67 percent of the active population are involved in agriculture and that almost all exports consist of farm products. However, taking the year 1970 as a base year with 100, the farm output index in 1978 was only 92; this is proof of the difficulties which this sector has been experiencing in the last decade.

At the time of independence, only 6.4 percent of the arable land (60 percent of the total area) were actually cultivated. Around one percent of the farm population was employed on well-mechanized farms, covering 2.5 million hectares or 50 percent of the cultivable land. On the other hand, 99 percent of the farmers were still engaged in subsistence agriculture. Mechanization has been introduced progressively to remedy this situation. In 1977, 5,600 tractors were in use and fertilizer consumption came to 14,500 tons. The main irrigation projects are: The plan for the development of the Limpopo basin and the Cabo Bassa project. In spite of the emphasis on food production, Mozambique in 1980 imported 335,000 tons of food products.

Among the main farm products we must mention sugar cane, cereal crops, cashew nuts, rice, raw cotton, sisal, and tea.

Tremendous Fish Potential

Livestock activities are being carried out essentially in the districts of Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane. The richest forest area is located in the region of Sofala. Although Mozambique's fish potential is tremendous, fishing is rather little developed; Mozambique has the longest coastline of all of the African countries along the Indian Ocean and a part of Lake Malawi.

Mozambican industry is mainly geared toward the processing of raw materials, such as sugar refining, the processing of cashew nuts, cereal crops, and cotton spinning and weaving.

In an effort to improve the sector, which was undertaken between 1977 and 1981, the branches which experienced the fastest development were the petroleum, rubber, heavy metal working, textile, and soap industries which, together, grew 44.6 percent. However, the impact of this growth was reduced by the 17.5-percent drop in the output of the beverage, tobacco, machine-building, light metal working, and cement industries.

In the energy field we must stress the refinery at Maputo with an annual output of 800,000 tons and the Cabo Bassa Dam whose output is sold entirely to South Africa.

The transportation system is perhaps the most developed sector of the Mozambican economy, serving not only domestic needs but also the needs of some neighbouring countries. By way of information we might mention that the railroad line net is 4,014 kilometers long; the three main ports are Maputo, Sofala, and Nacala, with Maputo handling 81.7 percent of the traffic volume.

One Truck for Tons of Cotton

Mozambique has traditionally had a deficit in its balance of trade. Although we do not have up-to-date statistical data, this situation is understandable if we take the combination of two factors into account: the fact that this is a weak economy which is extremely dependent on the outside world and the continuing deterioration of the terms of trade for that country. By way of example we might report the following: In 1975, Mozambique had to export

5.3 tons of cotton or 3.5 tons of cashew nuts to buy one truck. In 1981, it was necessary to export 12.9 tons of cotton or 4.5 tons of cashew nuts to purchase the same truck; from 1981 until 1982, the average price of Mozambican imports went up about 3 percent whereas the average price of exports dropped close to 11 percent.

Although we do not have more recent data on the structural makeup of Mozambican foreign trade, it is considered plausible that this structure has not changed substantially.

The following must be considered as Mozambique's chief suppliers in decreasing order of importance: The United Kingdom (heavy machinery, diesel locomotives, trucks, cars); the Soviet Union (heavy weapons, light automotive vehicles, fodder); Sweden (trucks, light automotive vehicles); Holland (chemical industry products); Portugal (see point 3.2), and South Africa (spare parts, raw materials for the light industry).

Mozambique's importers are as follows: The United Kingdom (cashew nuts, tea); Sweden (cotton); the Soviet Union (seafood, semiprecious stones); the FRG (coal), and Canada (sea cucumbers).

It should be noted that the situation in 1975 was substantially different, as we can see from the following table.

In 1975, this was the makeup of Mozambican imports and exports:

	Imports (%)	Exports (%)
Food products	13.5	57.2
Non-food farm products	0.9	23.1
Fuel and minerals	9.8	10.3
Machinery and equipment	35.2	4.7
Other manufactured products	40.0	4.8
Suppliers	%	
Portugal	23.8	
United States	13.7	
South Africa	8.1	
Japan	4.5	
India	4.6	
Importers		
South Africa	17.6	
Portugal	15.4	
FRG	10.7	
United Kingdom	7.7	
Nag. [as published]	5.7	

Portugal thus lost the position which it had as a supplier.

Over the past 3-1/2 years, the volume of purchases in Portugal increased substantially while there has been practically a stagnation in supply shipments. Consequently, the coverage rate dropped from 59.2 percent to 14.6 percent.

On the other hand, the development of the structure of Portugal's main exports to Mozambique is highly irregular with the exception perhaps of products such as "cotton fabrics" (80.5 percent of purchases in Mozambique during the first half of this year) and "medications for human and veterinary medicine." The same is not true of the development of the structure of the main products exported by Mozambique where we note a certain rigidity.

Imports: People's Needs Vs. Priority Items

The foreign trade of the People's Republic of Mozambique is nationalized. Government intervention is thus making itself felt in various ways: Both through the coordination of government agencies in terms of more effective control of operations with foreign countries and through the subordination of the various agencies to the obligation to supply the estimates of their import requirements by the end of each year. Centralization is currently handled through the National Directorate of Commerce.

Given the way in which the foreign trade of Mozambique is organized, the best way to get into this market is through contact with enterprises authorized to import goods.

To import commodities into Mozambique it is necessary to register previously in the BRI (Import Register Bulletin) through the National Directorate of Foreign Trade.

There are five priority levels for goods to be imported:

1st level: Basic products intended to meet the essential needs of the population, pharmaceutical products and the like;

Equipment and products for agriculture;

Petroleum products;

Spare parts;

Equipment for priority production activities;

Raw materials for priority production activities;

2nd level: Products needed for the well-being of the population;

Raw materials and equipment for less essential production activities;

3rd level: Articles of lesser interest for the well-being of the population;

4th level: Nonessential articles;

5th level: Luxury articles.

The products that are covered by the first three levels get priority when it comes to securing an import license.

Imports will be authorized without restrictions, with the following exceptions:

- (a) Forbidden imports;
- (b) Imports based on quotas;
- (c) Temporary imports;
- (d) Articles with a value of less than 2,500 MZE [expansion unknown];
- (e) Imports with installment payments or deferred payments;
- (f) Imports subject to preliminary technical and economic studies;
- (g) Imports of authorized raw materials to be used exclusively for industry.

Here are the shipping documents: Commercial billing statement, shipping notice and, for certain products of animal and vegetable origin, the health certificate.

A Difficult Period

In addition to difficulties of a structural nature, Mozambique is going through an extremely unfavorable period at this time. The drought in 1982, which has been affecting 50 percent of the population directly, is the main source: rainfall from January to December south of the Zambeze did not exceed 37-67 percent of the average precipitation recorded during the same period of time over the past 30 years. As a result, there has been a loss of 1 million tons of cassava, 300,000 tons of cereal crops, and 80,000 tons of beans and almonds. Cattle are dying at this time at an average rate of 500 head per day in the most heavily-hit areas.

To overcome this situation, Mozambique hopes to obtain results from international cooperation in view of the mutual advantages within the options adopted.

In this sense, the First Mixed Portuguese-Mozambican Commission, which met at the end of July, opened up broad prospects relating to the following: Establishment of projects in the fields of agriculture, livestock, and forestry, fishing, mining industry, processing industry, energy, public works and housing, transportation, communications, and meteorology; establishment of mixed production and sales enterprises; reduction of interest on loans for purchases in the consumer area, such as fabrics, production instruments, bread-baking equipment, hardware, parts for making shoes, canned food, bicycles, chinaware, and horse breeding [as published].

The implementation of Facim 83 in Maputo made it possible to familiarize Portuguese exporters with the crucial needs of the Mozambican economy. The exporters will therefore have to orient their offers toward products related to the primary sector in view of the priority which the Mozambican government is about to assign to this sector which is so vital to its economy.

Main Commodities Exported by Portugal to the People's Republic of Mozambique

(1,000 contos)

Commodities	1980	%	1981	%	1982(1)	%	1983(2)	%
Cotton fabrics, unfinished Sausages, sauces, and other filler materials	824.9	44.3	329.8	16.0	885.1	16.4	526.4	17.1
Parts and spare parts for rail vehicles	0.7	-	5.6	0.3	4.8	0.1	245.8	8.0
Axes, shovels, pickaxes, picks, etc.	4.6	0.2	119.0	5.8	378.6	7.0	196.7	6.4
Canned sardines in oil	4.2	0.2	3.0	0.1	93.7	1.7	166.3	5.4
Generators, motors, and rotary or stationary con- verters	9.7	0.5	2.5	0.1	26.7	0.5	136.7	4.4
Disinfectants, insecticides, and similar products	37.4	2.0	36.5	1.8	50.4	1.0	125.5	4.1
Medications for human and veterinary medicine	0.4	-	28.6	1.4	300.6	5.6	121.0	3.9
Books, brochures, and similar printed products	96.1	5.2	139.6	6.8	185.8	3.4	90.8	2.9
Machinery, apparatus, and mechanical installations, unassembled	9.1	0.5	23.4	1.1	129.6	2.4	46.2	1.5
Fabrics made of synthetic or artificial textile fibers	0.2	-	11.1	0.5	120.7	2.2	16.5	0.5
Nitrogenated fertilizer	8.5	0.5	59.8	2.9	150.9	2.8	15.9	0.5
Locks for water power installations	-	-	-	-	219.1	4.1	-	-
	-	-	5.7	0.3	154.2	2.9	-	-

Source: Foreign Trade Statistics, INE; (1) Preliminary figures; (2) Figures as of the first half
of 1983.

Main Commodities Imported by Portugal from the People's Republic of Mozambique
(1,000 contos)

Commodity	1980	%	1981	%	1982(1)	5	1983(2)	%
Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, refrigerated, dried, salted	5.9	0.5	30.3	2.9	69.3	6.2	41.0	9.1
Dried beans	9.2	0.8	7.8	0.8	15.5	1.4	-	-
Tea	15.5	1.4	11.7	1.1	17.0	1.5	-	-
Copra seeds and fruits	116.4	10.6	-	-	63.6	5.7	-	-
Raw cotton	637.2	57.9	887.4	85.9	811.9	72.3	361.3	80.5
Raw sisal	148.3	13.5	141.2	13.7	121.3	10.8	31.5	7.0

Source: Foreign Trade Statistics, INE; (1) Preliminary figures; (2) Figures as of the first half of 1983.

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MOZAMBIQUE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER ON PORTUGUESE PRISONERS, REGIONAL ISSUES

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 30 Sep 83 pp 20-21

[Interview with Joaquim Chissano, Mozambican minister of foreign affairs, by O JORNAL special correspondent Antonio Duarte, in Maputo, date not supplied]

[Text] Mozambican Foreign Affairs Minister Joaquim Chissano said in an interview with O JORNAL that the problem of the Portuguese prisoners in Mozambique "cannot be weighed in the assessment of the interests and the improved relations between the two countries.

"This issue is not a problem," Chissano declared, on the eve of President Samora Machel's visit to Portugal, an occasion which the Portuguese authorities will use to bring up the question of the Portuguese being held in Mozambique.

In the interview with O JORNAL, in his office in Maputo, Minister Chissano called Machel's visit to Portugal "historic." He also spoke of the imbalance of forces affecting Mozambique, in view of South Africa's increasing military power. He praised the "few Western countries" that are giving some military aid to the Mozambican forces, "because their position has more strategic merit."

[Question] Mr Minister, what significance do you attribute to President Samora Machel's visit to Portugal? Do you feel the trip would have been impossible before now? [If so,] why?

[Answer] I think this visit by President Samora Machel to Portugal is a historic event. It is a symbol of the rapprochement of the two peoples, who had been living apart and who had sometimes been put in direct confrontation by colonialism and fascism. This is the first visit to Portugal by a representative of a sovereign Mozambican government. It is the highest expression of the political will of the People's Republic of Mozambique to develop the ties of friendship and cooperation with the Portuguese republic. It is a step forward on the existing path of cooperation.

As to the timing of the visit, I must say that it had already been possible for some time. It would have been possible last year and perhaps even 2 years ago. Up to that point, and even after then, it was necessary to create the conditions so the visit could come about. There were several of these conditions, and they have existed for a while now. First there is the condition of mutual understanding between the parties; that is, a climate of understanding has been created between the two countries. Moreover, there has been a certain development of bilateral cooperation, as well as a feeling of mutual trust, sufficient for a friendly dialogue between the parties. Also, obviously, the visit had to fit into the schedules of the two presidents.

Open and Categorical Demonstration by Sa Carneiro

[Question] What were the principal steps taken to improve relations significantly between Portugal and Mozambique at all levels, to create these conditions?

[Answer] First, there was the practical demonstration by the Portuguese authorities of their recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the People's Republic of Mozambique. This demonstration was initiated by the president of the Portuguese Republic, through several indirect contacts, but it was expressed most openly and categorically by the late Prime Minister Sa Carneiro. Later, it was demonstrated to the Portuguese and Mozambican people by the friendly visit of his excellency, the president of the Portuguese republic, to the People's Republic of Mozambique, during which it was possible to clarify many positions on both sides, at the highest level, and to reaffirm the principles on which relations between the two states are based. Then there was the visit of Prime Minister Pinto Balsemao, which opened the door wider for relations at the government level. In both cases, Portuguese businessmen came along, too, representing a part of the Portuguese people. There were also various contacts at other levels: with Portuguese ministers, secretaries of state, army officers and other officials of both countries, which contributed to greater understanding between Portugal and Mozambique and between the leaders and the people. There was also the positive attitude of some sectors of the media, particularly in Portugal. (For a certain period, the Portuguese press was mostly negative toward Mozambique and did not foster a climate of understanding between the two countries.) We could also mention the activity--under cover, low profile, or what you will--of certain prominent individuals in Portugal, interested in improved relations between the two countries, for several reasons--some for reasons of principle. And I do not forget that there are also political forces, parties, which are interested in a growing improvement of relations between Mozambique and Portugal and which have also worked for this. So these were the various steps that were taken to create the conditions for understanding and improved relations between the two countries.

Cannot Single Out Portuguese Prisoners

[Question] One of the unsolved problems between Portugal and Mozambique, which will be an important item on the Portuguese agenda of discussions with Samora Machel, is the question of the Portuguese prisoners in Mozambique. Mr Minister, how do you think this problem could be solved?

[Answer] I do not believe this issue is related in any way to principles for relations between the two countries and the two peoples. If there are prisoners, it is because they committed irregularities which led to their arrest. So we feel this is not an issue that should weigh in the assessment of the interests and of improved relations between the two countries.

There are Portuguese in prison in Mozambique, just as there are Mozambican prisoners, Tanzanian prisoners and prisoners of other nationalities. What we do here is to apply justice, and I believe it would be in Portugal's interest to see that this justice is applied, and not to resent the fact that there are Portuguese in prison here. All people receive equal treatment here.

There are things that could be done; for example, we could deport these individuals. Many people have already argued that this is the correct treatment for those who have committed misdemeanors or crimes. But we feel this is discriminatory. It would be discrimination to treat Portuguese prisoners differently. We must apply justice. If the punishment is deportation, then deport. If there is some irregularity in the individual's status, because the issue is not clear, we could also opt for deportation, as a compromise. Frankly, however, I think that any treatment which is not based on the application of justice is really, in itself, discriminatory. But these questions are debatable.

To answer your question more precisely, I do not think this issue is a problem in terms of relations between the two countries, because "Portuguese prisoners" is not applicable as a general expression. What does "Portuguese prisoners" mean? It means that someone was a thief, another one raped...

[Question] There are, in fact, various types of prisoners, aren't there?

[Answer] There are various types of Portuguese prisoners, just as there are various types of Mozambican prisoners. What kind of treatment do the Mozambican prisoners receive? There is not just one treatment. It is the same thing with the Portuguese prisoners. They are in prison, as I said, because they have committed robberies or crimes of violence, or because they are in Mozambique illegally, or because they were speculators or black marketeers.

Case by Case

[Question] What is the answer for the Portuguese prisoners who were picked up in Operation Production or who are accused of residing illegally in Mozambique?

[Answer] Well, I don't know the answer in these cases. It is not a matter of a group of Portuguese prisoners, but of individuals who have violated various laws. The principle we apply is to take them case by case and to arrive at the correct ruling. It is also a question of what is in the best interest of the arrested individual: to legalize his situation, serve his sentence and then go on with his life in this country, or to be deported. It can also happen that the Mozambican state finds it suitable to expel this individual, or it can happen that the Portuguese Government insists that we deport the Portuguese who is being held, and that this may not be the best thing for the individual. All these questions must be taken into consideration and the issues settled case by case. This is the way we proceed.

Country Starting from Zero

[Question] What remains to be created and cultivated in cooperation between Portugal and Mozambique? What are the primary paths of relations between the two countries?

[Answer] There is already a very express and clear political will on both sides to continue with cooperation. Business has expressed an interest in cooperation. What remains now is to determine what projects are feasible, and to execute them. Then there are problems with execution. However, it is a matter of seeing what means Portugal has available to it and what means are available to Mozambique.

We are certain that both countries have resources. We have to find a way to put these Portuguese and Mozambican resources to use, to execute these projects. We look at the projects like production fields, to produce what we need. In particular, both countries lack "financing." The international crisis has had this effect. The only way to solve the problem is to produce. Then there are several ideas, and these ideas should be considered in accordance with the party guidelines--the execution of feasible projects aimed at solving the domestic problems that concern both countries. At this time, Mozambique is very concerned with solving the problems of food, clothing and housing. These problems are not felt to the same extent in other countries, even in developing countries. We have these problems because our country is starting from scratch. When I talk about "combating hunger," I do not just mean that we are interested in pure agriculture: to go to the field, run the tractor over it, cultivate it and sow some seed. This is not enough: we have to produce the goods which the peasants need, which motivate the peasants, and these are produced by industry, industry directed toward agriculture or to stimulate agriculture, livestock industry to help combat hunger.

International Cooperation, Solidarity with Socialist Countries

[Question] In the plan to diversify Mozambique's international relations, what are the priorities in Mozambique's current foreign policy?

[Answer] I don't know what you mean by this question, when you talk about the "plan to diversify relations...."

[Question] I mean, do Mozambique's priorities in its foreign relations point more toward the capitalist countries or the socialist countries?

[Answer] Well, well, but the problem is the idea that there is a "plan." There is no "plan" whatever to diversify these relations. There is certainly a principle, a constitutional principle. Article 23 of our constitution provides for relations of friendship and cooperation with all countries (and I stress the word "all"), "based on principles of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual benefit." This has been loudly proclaimed since 25 June 1975, and has been reiterated in the United Nations.

So to talk about a "plan" makes no sense, nor does establishing priorities. Our priorities are the countries which are really disposed to cooperate with us.

Well and good, but perhaps we should turn again to the constitution to explain our affinity with certain countries that are select, in terms of cooperation. In the constitution, we speak of "solidarity" with the socialist countries, but this does not make the difference. We are a socialist country; our solidarity with socialist countries is logical. Moreover, during our struggle for liberation, we had the solidarity of socialist countries--this was not cooperation, but solidarity with our cause. Our cause is the construction of socialism, and today we are united in solidarity with the countries which were united with us in our struggle. Even before we categorically defined--as we did in our Third Party Congress--the building of socialism as our foremost objective, we were already speaking of our solidarity with the socialist countries. However, this does not enter into the definition of priorities with regard to cooperation. In that area, we are open to cooperation with any country in the world, within the principles established in our constitution.

Nonalignment Does Not Mean Equidistance

[Question] Putting the question from another angle: given the Mozambican policy of nonalignment, are Mozambique's bilateral relations with the United States of America and the Soviet Union on an equal footing?

[Answer] Our view of nonalignment is perhaps different from that of the Western countries, particularly Western countries which are not members of the nonaligned movement. To us, nonalignment does not mean equidistance between social systems of economic development. We are socialists, in solidarity with other socialist countries--and with the Soviet Union to that extent--but not with the United States of America. We can, certainly, cooperate with the United States. Non-alignment has nothing to do with bilateral relations; it has to do with our position on issues of security, of war and peace. We are not going to have foreign military bases in Mozambique.

[Question] Not even Soviet...?

[Answer] Not Soviet and not U.S. bases. Because we are nonaligned. This is the meaning of nonalignment. But we cooperate with the United States and the Soviet Union in any area that does not clash with this principle of nonalignment. It must be clearly understood what nonalignment is. Nonalignment is not neutrality in matter of politics and systems of economic development, nor is it a middle road between socialism and capitalism.

Mozambique Threatened and Unprotected

[Question] Mr Minister, how do you rate Mozambique's status in the balance of forces in the southern African conflict?

[Answer] Mozambique is constantly threatened. It is constantly attacked in various ways. This is an undeclared war with South Africa. But Mozambique is constantly threatened with even greater aggression: that of occupation. We need only listen to the most recent statements of South African Defense Minister Magnus Milan, who is already interested in knowing the military budgets of the countries, who is already talking about opening a new front (he considers the front in Angola as the "first" front), which means Mozambique. Proof of this is the concentration of South African troops on our border, the division of Transvaal Province into

three military commands and the stepped-up recruitment of troops, precisely in Transvaal, as well as the increase in South Africa's military budget. So Mozambique feels truly threatened by all this military preparation by South Africa.

South Africa knows the extent of our military capacity very well, but it is adding greatly to its own capacity, although it is already adequate to take on all the countries of southern Africa.

[Question] So, in terms of the balance of forces, Mozambique is unprotected?

[Answer] Mozambique is unprotected in that sense, because it does not have the necessary materiel. But this does not mean that if South Africa attempts this aggression, it will come out unscathed and victorious. The human factor and justice count for much.

Western Military Cooperation Praised

[Question] Is note already being taken in Mozambique of the aid from the Western countries in defense of the nation's territorial integrity?

[Answer] Well, military cooperation with Western countries is already beginning to be noted, but on a limited scale--very few countries are involved so far. Portugal is one of them. In any event, this cooperation is not enough to change the balance of forces between Mozambique and South Africa. We feel, however, that the position of these few Western countries is praiseworthy, because it is very valuable strategically.

Opposition

[Question] The newspaper LE MONDE, reporting on actions of the self-styled Mozambican National Resistance [RNM], speaks of the "movement in opposition to the Samora Machel regime." Do you think the RNM is having an increasing international impact?

[Answer] Well, LE MONDE and all the Western newspapers (I don't know if yours is included) have persistently referred to the RNM "movement," a "movement" which does not exist. It is a "national resistance" which does not exist. There are armed bands, armed bands organized by South Africa.

It is all very well for the Western journalists to call the RNM a "movement" in "opposition to the regime," but in fact there is no opposition in Mozambique. Just talk to the people. There are enormous problems in Mozambique, and the people feel them keenly (now there is even a water shortage in Maputo and the people are unhappy--and I'm unhappy, too, because we have no water at our house). But the people have great confidence--and this was demonstrated on May Day, after the end of our congress--in their government, in their party, because they know that their party and their government are concerned. The party and the government are the first to say to the people that we are suffering and that we have problems, and to explain why we are suffering and why we have problems. And we are searching for solutions, together with the people .

Now, when someone comes, sent by the South Africans, to talk to our people, our people simply don't listen to him. It is true that sometimes we see people gathering around the armed bands--a "wall of protection" for the armed bands. This "wall" is possible because, when the armed bands reach a village, they burn everything, destroy everything, kill children and force the terrified people to join them, but when our forces manage to liberate these people, they rejoice. I myself have taken part in these actions, more than once, and I saw how it was. I was very reassured. Because I have taken part in this action, I can say with more conviction, to a reporter like yourself, that we have no opposition in Mozambique.

As for the international impact of the armed bands, I have also spoken with many diplomats accredited here in Mozambique and even diplomats in other countries, and I think the world understands very well that these are armed bands, and the world does not approve of any of the actions of the armed bands.

The world has already understood that these individuals are manipulated by South Africa, and it clearly sees the South African hand and its command over these armed bandits, who have no prospects at all. The Mozambican people know this and they cannot go along with the propositions of the RNM. This is the impact that the armed bands have abroad, as well. The whole world knows. I just can't understand why the reporters cover them.

[Question] Perhaps because the RNM has the power to reach the media.

[Answer] Yes, but even the reporters know what they are. This access to the foreign press comes through South Africa, through representatives who are not even Mozambican.

No Interference in Chad

[Question] What is Mozambique's position on the civil war in Chad?

[Answer] We think it would be appropriate to let the Chadian people solve the problem, without any foreign interference or intervention. Any part in solving the Chadian problem should be in terms of encouraging the parties involved to negotiate a solution, to sit down at the table and discuss it. The efforts made in the past, in Lagos, should be continued through the OAU, but always in the sense of sitting down at the table and arriving at a foundation for national unity.

[Question] Minister, when you talk about foreign interference, are you also referring to Qadhafi's forces, the Libyan forces?

[Answer] I am referring to all the African and extra-African forces. We do not legitimize governments. This is the prerogative of the Chadian people, and this is why it is necessary that the conditions be there for the Chadian people to speak their minds about what their legitimate government is.

MOZAMBIQUE

COUNTRY'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, MNR GUERRILLAS DESCRIBED

London AFRICA NOW in English Dec 83 pp 86-88

[Text]

South African armoured columns striking across the border into Mozambique, seizing Maputo and setting up a puppet administration in the south of the country. This was the scenario which a secret Zimbabwean intelligence report last year reckoned could lead to the overthrow of President Machel within 48 hours.

A "worst case" scenario it might be, but the possibility of a South African invasion of this kind is of real concern to Mozambique — particularly since South Africa's close ally, Israel, invaded Lebanon last year.

The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) punched across the border into Lebanon in three fast-moving columns. One moved up the coast, spearheaded by Centurian tanks, followed by mechanised infantry brigades in armoured personnel carriers and getting close support from ground attack fighter planes. This column also got support from amphibious armour and infantry units shipped up the coast to bypass PLO positions. Another tank-led column seized the bridge over the Litani river in the centre of the area; the third column in the east took the Beaufort Castle using self-propelled artillery and helicopter-borne infantry units to leapfrog over PLO positions as far as the Syrian armour in the Bek'a valley.

The Syrians were neutralised by the destruction of their SAM 6 surface-to-air missile complexes, by the shooting down of nearly 30 MiG fighters and the destruction of dozens of tanks. Five days after the start of the operation a ceasefire was called, with most of the Israeli aims achieved, apart from the removal of the PLO defences in Beirut, even though it had all taken longer than expected and cost an estimated \$1.5bn.

Subsequently, the IDF was less successful, with its efforts to set up an administration in South Lebanon under Major Haddad and his Christian militia failing to get off the ground.

Nevertheless, in those five days, June 6 to 11, the IDF had smashed through a trained and highly motivated force of some 5,000

PLO fighters, equipped with 80 tanks and over 300 artillery pieces, among them the 40-barrelled BM 21 rocket-launchers and the ZSU 23-4 anti-aircraft guns as well as the more usual guerrilla weapons like RPG7 anti-tank rifles and SAM7s. The PLO had even been expecting the attack. When it came, the Israeli speed, fire-power and numbers (which amounted to 65,000 by the end of the operation), proved just too much.

Mozambique is well aware that South Africa could put together much the same sort of attack. On a number of occasions, notably in Angola, it has shown it is prepared to do so. Six years ago the commander of the South African Defence College was lecturing his students on the specific importance to be attached to Israeli tactics. Only last year a South African Defence white paper drew attention to the need to consider "seriously" conventional warfare possibilities, as opposed to guerrilla-style operations. Early in 1983, conscription in South Africa was drastically extended.

The South African raids on the Matola suburbs of Maputo in January 1981 and in May 1983 by Impala and Mirage jets have tested Mozambique's defences, as did the pilotless drone spy plane shot down over Maputo in June. This was one of the Israeli-made IAI Scout drones used by the IDF in the Bek'a Valley in 1982 to draw Syrian missile fire so that the missile batteries could be pinpointed and destroyed. Maputo is only 40 miles away from the border; there is the big South African military base at Phalaborwa near the Kruger National Park; and the air base at Hoedspruit is only a matter of a few minutes flying time from Maputo. It would not be difficult for South African columns to cross the border in several places.

Should such a decision ever be taken, South Africa has a formidable force available; and its strike force capacity is steadily being increased. There is the 8th division's 81st armoured brigade, made up of two tank battalions and two mechanised

battalions; and the 7th division's mechanised brigade composed of one tank and three mechanised battalions. The other four brigades in the two divisions are technically motorised but they are being upgraded to full mechanised status. In addition, there is the special recce regiment and the three battalion-strong paratroop brigades. The capacity of the two strike brigades at full strength amounts to about 180 main battle tanks and 250 armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers. When the other four brigades are fully mechanised they will add another 240 tanks and 600 armoured cars and APCs. The total manpower involved would then amount to 40,000 men.

The South African army uses Oliphant tanks, an adaptation of the British Centurion which carries a 105mm gun. It is slower than the Russian-made T34s and T54s used by Mozambique but it can out-gun either and the latest models have been re-engined to give greater speeds. The armoured cars and APCs available to South Africa are various. They include the AML Eland Mk IV (a South African version of the French Panhard AML) armed with either 90mm guns or 60mm mortars. The brigades have powerful artillery support with Sexton 25 pounder (88mm) self-propelled anti-tank guns with 12,000 metre range, as well as the South African-made G5 155mm guns and the latest G6 155mm self-propelled howitzers, though these last have yet to become operational. When they do, they will be able to out-range anything Mozambique has. They are, in fact, claimed to be better than anything comparable in the world and were specially developed to deal with the 122mm guns used by the Cubans with great effect in Angola in 1976/1977 against the South Africans. The G6 has a range of 40,000 metres, a speed of up to 90kms-an-hour on good roads and a fire rate of four shells a minute.

Air support for all this armour includes the Impala (South Africa's version of the Italian Aeronautica Maachi MB 326 K light attack-plane) which carries bombs and air-to-surface missiles; and the Mirage F 1AZ ground-attack fighter. The South Africans also have four helicopter squadrons, two with 316/319 Alouette 111s which can carry half a dozen troops but which are mainly used as helicopter gunships being armed with air-to-surface missiles, canon and machine guns and 68mm rockets. The other helicopter units fly Puma armed transport machines which can carry 20 men apiece and Super Frelon heavy-duty helicopters which carry 30 men each.

Mozambique's forces cannot compare with this weight of firepower. There is a tank brigade and its main force of seven infantry brigades is organised in a sophisticated mix of tank, mechanised, artillery and air defence battalions in each brigade. But the tanks are mostly the outdated T34s, only armed with 8mm guns and most recently

the T54s and T55s which still suffer by comparison with the Oliphant.

The tank battalions are not yet up to full strength, nor are the mechanised units though they have a variety of useful APCs, including BTR 60s and 152s as well as the BRDM reconnaissance vehicles and the BTR 40s armed with Sagger anti-tank guided weapon systems.

Air support, too, is limited, to the MiG 17s, though MiG 21s are expected, and a handful of troop-carrying Mi8 helicopters.

In artillery, Mozambique does have the formidable BM21 rocket launchers which have a range of 20,000 metres as well as the 122mm and 130mm guns which range up to 23,000 and 27,000 metres. Anti-tank capacity is also provided by M101 105mm howitzers.

Air defence is provided by ZSU 23-4 considered one of the best weapons available; and by SA3 and SA6 missile systems. Both are low level/medium-range missiles — it was the SA6s which suffered so much at Israeli hands in the Bekaa valley in 1982. There are also SAM7s which are operator-aimed, infra-red, homing missiles which operate up to about a quarter of the range of the others, about 6,500 metres.

Mozambique's military problems since independence have been two-fold. After independence Mozambique decided to move away from the guerrilla-type force which had won the war against the Portuguese and try to organise a conventional army in the face of what it saw as the main threat — from Rhodesia and South Africa. So the present army is the result of a slow process to that end. It still has a long way to go although in October 1979 it performed very creditably in blunting a Rhodesian invasion force; and the artillery battalion sent to help Tanzania in the war against Amin in 1979 proved its worth against the Libyans and at Kampala.

The army could not defeat any major South African invasion using the forces mentioned above; but it could perhaps give it unacceptably high casualties. Casualty rates, as the South African operations in Namibia and Angola have demonstrated, are a political factor in South Africa and the White population is sensitive to them. It is, therefore, vital for Mozambique that it keeps at least this capacity to damage any South African incursions seriously.

But the army's efforts to build up a strong conventional force have been distracted over the last couple of years by the resurrection of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), the most immediately apparent threat, and one the reorganised conventional army has been largely unable to meet.

The original operations of the Rhodesian organised MNR came to an end in late 1979 when its leader, Andre Mutade Matsangai, was killed. The subsequent loss of Rhodesian support as Zimbabwe became independent and an internal power struggle virtually broke the MNR. Only massive

South African support revitalised it in late 1980/81.

The continued extent of South African involvement was again underlined last August when a major MNR base at Tomé in Inhambane province was captured. Only a couple of weeks earlier South African helicopters had brought in some nine tons of arms and ammunition. Evidence was also found that South Africans had come into Tomé to train radio operators and to seek out recruits for training in South Africa. By the end of 1981 the MNR was operating in Manica and Sofala provinces, in Inhambane and in Gaza on a considerable scale. It had about 3,000 men under arms and as many more training.

The government was apparently taken by surprise. It certainly reacted slowly. Military effectiveness was hampered by the switch going on to conventional military thinking and also by problems within the armed forces after independence which persisted far too long. In the euphoria of victory some guerrilla commanders wanted more than they got. For example, in 1977 just after the third party congress, a number of high-ranking officers had to be arrested. They were charged with causing "a separation" between the people and the armed forces. Among them were the commanders and deputy commanders of two of the infantry battalions. It was in part because of this that a special party secretariat for defence and security was set up. It has not been a total success. In February 1981 Machel himself admitted that the previous month's raid on Maputo had been possible because of army corruption and incompetence. Vital messages were delayed and it took 10 hours for General Mabote, the Chief of Ground Staff, to get the news of the border crossing. Eight traitors were subsequently identified, one being the head of General Mabote's own office.

A few months later, Machel was publicly admitting there had been many complaints about the army, comprehensively accusing it of intimidation, repression, armed robbery, rape, torture and bribery. In mid-1981, 92 members of the Ministry of Defence's own workshops went on trial for corruption.

Even in April 1982, Joao Phalembe a former top guerrilla commander and Governor of Gaza, was sacked for immoral conduct and President Machel later spoke of ambition, individualism, intrigue, abuse of power and sexual corruption. Examples could be multiplied.

It was not until 1982 that the administration and the army really began to pull itself together and look for a coherent strategy to deal with the MNR threat. Efforts were made to rebuild the guerrilla ethos of the armed forces and the army's political awareness. It was at this time that the USSR's head of political administration in the army, General Alexei Yepichev, paid a visit to Mozambique. Old FRELIMO veterans were recalled to the colours and significantly a

number were elected to the central committee of the party at the fourth congress in April 1983. These included some like Manuel Manjicke who had previously been expelled for arrogance and corruption in 1978. Cândido Mondlane, a brilliant guerrilla commander, who had been dismissed for "high living," was brought back in 1982; last May he was appointed major-general for his part in the operations against the MNR in the south.

There have been a number of military shake-ups. Former guerrilla commanders were appointed to be provincial military leaders in March 1982; but the process has not finished. Last August, Brigadier Ajope (who commanded the operations against the Rhodesians in 1979) was appointed to head military operations in Zambesia; seven other top officers were also appointed to the same task force. At the same time a number of senior officers were sacked, accused of incompetence and more seriously of failing to fight over the previous six months.

More important has been the decision to organise a local militia. Training started in 1982 and over 400 Tanzanians have arrived to help; and Portugal provided some 17 tons of guns and uniforms.

President Machel has been emphasising the old guerrilla virtues of the army producing its own food, not taking it from the people, and of organising the local population politically.

Army training has also been adapted. Special commando units have been set up. North Korea has trained an anti-guerrilla brigade which became operational in late 1983. In the light of the activity of the North Korean-trained 5th brigade in Zimbabwe and its operations in Matebeleland, this might seem counter-productive. But the unit will be commanded by Fernando Honwana, one of Machel's top advisers, and it is unlikely to get out of control. Zimbabwe itself is being approached to provide NCO training. On his recent visit to Britain, Machel got an agreement to send Mozambican officers to Sandhurst Military Academy.

The results of the new policies and of new tactics first began to be visible in late 1982 and early 1983 when General Mabote, now Vice-Minister of Defence, took personal charge of operations in Gaza province. Bringing in several extra battalions, and with the aid of the 1,000 Zimbabwean troops who help patrol the rail and oil pipeline links to Zimbabwe, a string of MNR bases were wiped out. The MNR pulled out of Gaza early in 1983. But successes like these, while possible, will be fragile while South Africa continues to provide the support it does for the MNR, and while the army's discipline remains fragile.

Mozambique needs much more weaponry for a proper counter-guerrilla strategy; and it needs heavier material to deter South Africa. The two problems are indivisible. General Mabote put in a bid

for more planes (MiG21s and Mi8 helicopters) and for T54 and T55 tanks when he visited Moscow in mid-1982. But the shopping list is not confined to Moscow, though there are some 1,000 military and security advisers from socialist allies in Mozambique at the moment. On his recent trip to Europe, Machel found both Yugoslavia and France indicating their willingness to help. France in particular is important as Machel would like Alouette 111s, which are very versatile anti-guerrilla weapons which can be used either as troop transports or as helicopter gunships. Other vital aspects of anti-guerrilla operations are ground mobility and communications. Mozambique is getting radios and land rovers from Britain.

It all adds up to the need for a substantial and comprehensive package with which to carry out the more flexible strategy needed to cope with the twin threats of South Africa and the MNR. So a highly mobile and politicised army is needed, backed up by local militia, to deal with guerrilla attacks but which still has sufficient fire-power to deter any invasion by conventional South African forces.

With the purges and restructuring of the armed forces some progress has been made. But as President Machel knows, there is a long way to go; and with incursions so popular these days, he may not get the time Mozambique needs •

CSO: 3400/453

MOZAMBIQUE

PORtUGUESE MISSIONARY REPORTEDLY MURDERED BY MNR

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 1 Dec 83 p 12

[Report by M.V.B.]

[Text] O JORNAL has learned, from a reliable source, the circumstances surrounding the murder of a Portuguese missionary, Father Alirio Baptista, of the Portuguese Missionary Society (Cucujaes fathers). The murder took place 60 kilometers from the city of Nampula on the night of 20 November, and was perpetrated by members of the so-called Mozambican National Resistance.

Caught in an ambush against members of the Agricultural school of Ribaue by members of the resistance group, Father Alirio Baptista was mortally wounded. He was traveling in a vehicle which was also carrying a teacher at the Iapala mission. The latter was only wounded, managing to escape the crossfire between the "resisters" and the FRELIMO forces which had, meanwhile, intervened in the action.

Father Alirio Baptista, aged 53, was a native of Calvao, Vagos (oddly enough, the same locality as Father Laurindo de Nato, who was captured and then released by UNITA in September 1982). Father Baptista had been a missionary in the Nampula diocese for 27 years. He was a teacher in that city and was later named economic secretary of the diocese and pastor of the cathedral. At the time of his death, he was the father superior of the Iapala mission.

The funeral was conducted by the bishop of Pemba, substituting for Manuel Pinto, bishop of the diocese, who was away in Brazil.

This is the first Portuguese missionary (priest) to be killed in Mozambique since independence. Last year a Portuguese nun was killed near Maputo, under circumstances that are not yet completely clear. Sporadically, some missionaries (fathers and nuns) have been abducted by the "resistance" and then released.

Alirio Baptista is the second missionary from the Portuguese Missionary Society to be murdered in the former colonies. The first was Armindo de Lima, victim of an ambush on the outskirts of Luanda.

MOZAMBIQUE

DATA PROCESSING CENTER TRAINING PROGRAM

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 29 Nov 83 p 3

[Article by Marcelino Silva]

[Text] The training goal of the Data Processing Center [CPD] is the continuing improvement of the professional and technical level of its workers, so their services will will meet the demands imposed by the needs of its users and of the CPD itself. To this end, a training program was initiated, geared to the CPD's technical and personnel needs, we learned from Mario Rui, general director of the CPD.

The Data Processing Center, better known by the initials CPD, is an organization whose primary function is the collection, processing, treatment and analysis of data, through computerized systems. Some of its attention is turned to supporting other sectors of activity.

Created about 5 years ago, the CPD saw an urgent need to begin to train basic, intermediate and high-level personnel, not only on the basis of specific training programs but training directed toward meeting immediate needs. Although there was a shortage of instructors and material resources at that time, the program still went forward, and with satisfactory results.

30 Courses

In the 5 years the CPD has been in existence, there have been 30 courses, in which 300 basic level, 50 mid-level and 20 high-level cadres were trained.

According to the director, all the workers employed by the CPD were locally trained.

Describing the nature of the courses and training levels, our interviewee said that the basic level includes the categories of operators who record data of various types, according to the equipment, and data processors. The medium level includes the specific areas of computer programming and operations, and the highest level covers the areas of systems analysis, planning and design, as well as various operational systems.

Personnel training at the CPD is designed, on hand, "to meet the needs of the center itself and, on the other hand, the needs of companies and other entities which have or will come to have computers," the official explained.

In view of the complex nature of information systems, the courses are open only to workers who have completed the 6th, 9th and 11th grades, for basic, mid-level and high-level training, respectively.

Exceptions

Occasionally, it happens that workers with a lower level of education are admitted to the courses for which they would normally not be eligible. This happens with those who have demonstrated good working skills, and the admission generally functions as a reward. For example, all the workers who won socialist emulation awards in the data processing for the first General Population Census were admitted to the minicomputer programming courses, regardless of their educational level.

Specialization Abroad

Regarding specialized training abroad, we learned that, although the CPD currently has no workers in training abroad, the center has paid for foreign training for technicians of ENEME, the company responsible for maintaining the computers; the technicians are being trained specifically in this area.

Two ENEME technicians are taking 15-month courses abroad, and three more workers will be sent abroad next January.

Professional Careers

The Secretariat of State for Labor recently approved, provisionally, a professional career plan in the specific area of data processing; it will have three distinct levels: basic, mid-level and higher-level. According to our interviewee, these levels in no way correspond to the levels of the New System of Education and refer only to the technical-professional expertise to perform the tasks in each job category.

We also learned that these professional careers are being reviewed, under the guidance of the Labor Secretariat and with the participation of various other agencies, to determine the general criteria for this type of activity. Associated with this review is the definition of the "personnel pyramid" of the CPD, which will be the basis for manpower planning at the center.

6362
CSO: 3442/86

MOZAMBIQUE

NEW FISH MARKETING PLAN IN BEIRA

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 26 Nov 83 p 10

[Text] With a view to improving the fish supply in Beira, a new marketing system was recently introduced in that city, which will enable the fishermen to market their product without the intervention of any middlemen. As DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE learned from Domingos Mostico, responsible for the fishing sector in the Provincial Directorate of Industry and Energy, the new marketing system will prevent the fish from being channeled into the black market.

In the new system, the fisherman is responsible for vending his product to the consumers. This will serve as an incentive for increased production, inasmuch as the fisherman's work will not serve to enrich third parties before his product reaches the market.

Of the 22 markets to benefit from the new marketing system, 4 are located in the urban zone and deal directly with the fishermen who are located there, according to their capacity to supply the public. Domingos Mostico told DIARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE that the larger producers are placed in districts where they regularly supply fish to the residents, who keep watch to see that there are no diversions to the speculators.

Mostico added that supervision of the fish marketing process begins in the fishing zone, where the fisherman is given a scale to weigh his product. He is given a pass which indicates the amount of fish he is taking to his assigned district for sale. The markets which receive the fish verify the amount indicated on the transit pass before the fish goes on sale. There is a schedule for retail fish prices for the city of Beira.

The fish are sold in the markets by private and small-scale fishermen. With the new vending system, there has been less speculation in the product, although the system of direct barter (product for product) still persists in some cases.

6362

CSO: 3442/86

MOZAMBIQUE

RESERVOIR FILLING AT MASSINGIR DAM

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 25 Nov 83 p 8

[Text] As a result of the rain which has been falling since the beginning of this month, the reservoir at Massingir Dam has risen from a minimal volume of 7.5 million cubic meters to 180 million cubic meters of water. Although this is far from capacity, National Water Directorate hydrologists consider it highly encouraging for the agricultural campaign which has begun in the hydrographic basin of the Limpopo River, particularly in the Chokwe area, which is receiving a regular flow of 40 cubic meters per second to irrigate the rice for the 1983/1984 harvest.

According to a source connected with the use of the Massingir Dam, in this phase, up to 1,400 million cubic meters of water could be accumulated in the reservoir, and up to 2,800 million cubic meters could be exploited in the future.

The Massingir reservoir is fed by the Elefantes River, the major tributary of the Limpopo River. Because of the rains which have fallen along the Elefantes, it has risen considerably, with a flow ranging from 90 to 300 cubic meters per second.

This does not mean, however, that the drought problem in the area has been solved, because the mother river, the Limpopo, is still dry, particularly between Combomune and the point of confluence with the Elefantes River. For any substantial improvement, the rain will have to continue to fall regularly until the end of the year, according to the hydrologists.

The Unbeluzi River, in Maputo Province, has also risen sharply as a result of the rain that fell at the beginning of this week; in the border zone of Goba, it peaked at 63 cubic meters per second, almost the same figure that was reached on 14 November, which was 69 cubic meters per second.

Repair of Telephone Lines

At the end of this week, Mozambique Post and Telecommunications should complete the repairs to the downed poles and lines in the Maputo Province telephone system, which were damaged during the storm that devastated the south of the country this week.

"We have already restored the Boane-Maputo and Maputo-Ressano Garcia trunk lines, as well as the international lines and the high frequencies on Monte Pondoine, in Namaacha. At this time Moamba and Boane already have service. The only thing left to repair is the Namaacha line, which we expect to restore tomorrow," a Mozambique Post and Telecommunications source reported.

In addition, most of the downed poles in the Alto Mae, Machava and Matola zones have been uprighted and the rest should be put up in the next week.

The real work, however, will be to repair the breakdowns in the telephones themselves. This is expected to begin next week.

"This will be a slow job, because a large increase in breakdowns was registered as a result of the storm. At the moment, 900 phones are out of order, 470 of them in the Baixa zone and 370 in Machava and Matola. We hope to ease this situation by the end of next week, but we will not complete all the repairs, not only because there are so many breakdowns but also because of the problem of the lack of materials," the source added.

6362
CSO: 3442/86

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

UDISTP DENOUNCES REGIME, CALLS FOR PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 1 Dec 83 p 5

[Text] In a document which reached our desk yesterday, the Democratic and Independent Union of Sao Tome e Principe (UDISTP) denounced the "totalitarian, tyrannical and aggressive regime installed in Sao Tome e Principe" as most unsuitable for the Sao Tomian people, because it disregards the most elementary liberties and rights of men. The document also says that the Sao Tomian people are oppressed and are seriously threatened with losing their quality and character as a nation, which is becoming a feudal state.

In the document, the UDISTP says that the way to save Sao Tome and its people is to unite all the forces of opposition to form a front to fight the regime; it declares that the government and the political leadership of the MLSTP are illegitimate and that the "totalitarian and tyrannical regime" headed by Manuel Pinto da Costa must be overthrown, by any means possible.

Thus the UDISTP stresses the need to form a provisional government, the purpose of which will be to convene a national constituent assembly, elected by universal and secret vote, to adopt measures to insure the formal administration of government and of the state, and to implement immediate measures of a material, economic, social and cultural nature to guarantee the effective future exercise of the political liberties of the citizens.

The document which we received from the UDISTP declares that it will then be necessary to promote freedom of meeting and association, to permit the formation of political associations, the nuclei of future political parties, and to guarantee union freedom--indispensable foundations for the functioning of a truly democratic state. Finally, the document affirms the vital need to create secure bases for economic and social recovery.

6362
CSO: 3442/84

NEGATIVE, POSITIVE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AID TO NATION

London AFRICA NOW in English Nov 83 pp 76, 77

[Text]

The West rushes to give Somalia aid, yet the nomads who make up the majority of the population are better-off than conventional economic indicators would suggest

The tiny size of the Somali economy coupled with the political pressures which operate in the area make it especially vulnerable to external pressures. These take the form of relatively huge aid inputs.

The gross national product stands at approximately shs20,000m in real terms, a GNP of about \$1,000m. The current level of aid is \$400m a year, equivalent to 40% of GNP, while debt now also stands at about \$1bn.

This position is complicated further by the refugee question. After the Ogaden war, it was estimated that one million or more refugees fled to Somalia. Now the official figure is 700,000 refugees and the annual bill to feed and maintain them comes to \$120m, all coming from international sources.

The Somali economy depends first upon livestock exports, then bananas and third the traditional export (and now a world monopoly) of frankincense. Livestock, the wealth of the country's 60% nomadic population, sustains the economy and accounts for 80% of exports and foreign exchange earnings. Animals are exported live, mainly across the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia but also to other countries in the Gulf. But food imports have been increasing in recent years — wheat and rice — and the import bill for these now runs at some \$25m a year.

There has been a change of emphasis since 1980 with the government giving greater encouragement to the private sector. The Somali industrial sector is minuscule and parts of it in any case are not always working through lack of spare parts or other inputs including raw materials from abroad.

Government priorities are firm: first the

livestock sector and second the encouragement of settled farming which has been boosted recently by a liberalisation of marketing practices and better prices for farmers. The best agricultural market lies in the Middle East except for bananas, 50% of which go to Italy. Leather is also exported to Italy and the Middle East. Two years ago inflation ran at 45% but the government has managed to reduce this to a current rate of 20%.

The aid flow reached the \$400m mark in 1982 and looks set to stay at or about that level. The reasons for this large inflow to such a small country are complex. The Cold War and the Russian-Cuban presence in Ethiopia is clearly a major factor; the presence of the refugees is another; while development in its true sense perhaps lies third.

Aid inputs at this level are altering Somali attitudes and increasing, markedly, the lures of Western-style materialism. Food aid, for example, which is not really needed is changing tastes from traditional staples (maize and sorghum) to rice and wheat. The 1982-86 development plan expects to find 80% of its capital from external sources.

Donors unfortunately tend to treat Somalia as though it only requires their aid — and their presence — to solve its economic problems. But massive aid inputs have to be seen against the capacity of the small infrastructure to absorb them. They should also be seen as possibly inhibiting Somali efforts at self-reliance.

The main aid donors now are the US, West Germany, Italy, the World Bank, the EEC, China and Saudi Arabia. Chinese aid includes MiG fighters, roadbuilding and medical assistance. EEC aid is increasing while the two most important European

donors are Italy (for traditional reasons) and West Germany. The Italians are assisting banana development. There is in any case an Italian community of about 5,000 and the Italians have the largest share of business and commercial investment. The West German aid programme — dating from the successful Somali handling of the Lufthansa hijack five years ago — now runs at DM80m a year.

But it is American aid which has come to set the pace. The US returned to Somalia in 1978. This year their aid is running at \$50m and is scheduled to increase to a rate of \$70m in 1984 while currently \$120m worth of projects are underway.

An ideological argument about the merits of aid centres upon the proposed Bardera Dam on the Juba. The government wants it. The cost, which only aid could finance, is currently estimated at between \$630m and \$800m but by the time the project goes forward it will almost certainly have escalated. Some money has been pledged but in the present economic climate it seems unlikely that the dam can be started for some time.

It raises fundamental issues about development. The dam is designed to bring more than 200,000 hectares of land under irrigation and cultivation. But it will require continuing inputs (for many years) of spare parts, machinery and fertiliser which will have to be paid for in foreign exchange, as well as the almost certain need for a large contingent of foreign experts. It is debatable whether that would be the best form of development for an economy as small as Somalia's.

Somalia faces many difficulties especially those of poor infrastructure and lack of skilled people at almost all levels. There is very little available data about the economy and yet, almost certainly, the country is better off than Western-type UN indicators of GNP per head would suggest. The nomads are economically healthy while it is virtually impossible to assess their standard of living. At present they sustain the economy ●

CSO: 3400/446

SOMALIA

FORMER MINISTER HELD IN SOLITARY

London AFRICA NOW in English Nov 83 p 84

[Text] Omar Arteh Ghalib, a former Somali Foreign Minister, was arrested with six other officials for opposing President Barreh. They have been held incomunicado for more than a year and one, Warsame Ali Farah, has recently died in detention.

Ghalib, Farah and the others were arrested on June 9 1982 after they had tried to organise members of the Central Committee of the ruling party to vote against the renomination for a further term of President Siyad Barreh. They are also believed to have criticised his rule and government policies.

They were charged under National Security Law 54 with "endangering the independence, unity and security of the state" and "conspiracy against the state." Each offence carries a mandatory sentence of death and confiscation of property. The National Security Law of 1970 provides for the death penalty for a large number of offences, including treason, sedition, going on strike and "using religion to destroy the unity of the nation."

The authorities have given no details of the basis for the charges or a date for the detainees' trial before the National Security Court. This court, which has regional sections, is composed mainly of army and police officers, often without legal training. Legal representation is permitted but most legal safeguards for defendants in civil courts are absent. Trials are generally summary and defendants have no right of appeal.

Omar Arteh Ghalib was Foreign Minister from 1969 to 1976. He was educated at Bristol University in the UK. He is 53 and is married with 12 children.

At the time of his arrest he was First Vice-Speaker of the People's National Assembly as well as being a member of the Central Committee of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, the sole legal political party.

The other six people detained at the same time as Ghalib were also all members of parliament and of the Central Committee. They were Warsame Ali Farah, Third Vice-President Ismail Ali Abokor, Colonel Osman Mohamed Ghelle, Major-General Omar Haji Mohamed, Mohamed Aden Sheikh and Mohamed Yusuf Weirah.

Except for Farah, formerly chairman of the Party's foreign relations committee, who died on July 20, 1983, they are all believed to be held in solitary confinement in Labatan Jirow maximum security prison near Baidowa.

The cause of Farah's death is not known and the Somali Government has made no statement on it. He suffered from diabetes and high blood pressure and was receiving treatment before he was detained. At the time of his arrest he was receiving medical treatment at the Medina hospital in Mogadishu. It is reported that security forces arrested him at the hospital. The body was returned to his family and his funeral reportedly took place in Mogadishu.

According to the human rights organisation Amnesty International, most political prisoners in Somalia are held in the modern maximum security prisons of Labatan Jirow or Lanta Nur, near Afgoi. In these prisons many prisoners are held incomunicado in long-term solitary confinement. Political prisoners are denied visits or correspondence with their families, who often have no information about their whereabouts or condition.

Some prisoners are held for long periods in small cells without light, or in cells permanently lit with artificial light. Several prisoners held under these conditions are alleged to have become mentally unbalanced or to have suffered other severe medical complaints, particularly related to eyesight, hearing or blood pressure. Prison diet is poor and medical attention inadequate, according to Amnesty International.

CSO: 3400/446

TANZANIA

ZCCM TO SHIP ALMOST EIGHTY PERCENT OF EXPORTS THROUGH DAR ES SALAAM

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 22 Dec 83 p 1

[Article by John Waluye]

[Text]

THE Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) will from next month ship almost 80 per cent of anticipated metal exports from Zambia through the Dar es Salaam Port, it has been learnt.

The decision was reached at a one-day meeting of the Zambia-Tanzania Transport Coordinating Committee held at the Bahari Beach Hotel in Dar es Salaam on Tuesday.

The ZCCM will now allocate an average of 38,000

tonnes of copper per month, the General Manager of the National Shipping Agencies Company (NASACO), Ndugu Chriswell Simfukwe, who chaired the meeting, said.

He said between September and November this year, ZCCM had been shipping only 57 per cent of the metals through Dar es Salaam, while the rest was routed through the South African port of East London.

He said ZCCM decided to route more cargo through Dar es Salaam Port after observing improved performance by TAZARA, the Zambia-Tanzania Road Services (ZTRS) and the Tanzania Harbours Authority.

Manager said.

With the new higher motive power, the time taken by the trains to load up and ferry to Dar es Salaam Port has been reduced to eight days from 37 days.

About two months ago, this newspaper quoted the TAZARA General Manager, Ndugu Charles Nyirenda, as saying that the authority was transporting less Zambian cargo than its capacity, even though the Zambian Government had directed its mining companies to export not less 33,000 tonnes of copper every month through TAZARA.

He said although TAZARA had been pressing for more metals to rail to Dar es

Ndugu Simfukwe said ZCCM had in June, this year, shipped through the Dar es Salaam Port 32,550 tonnes of copper, while 20,150 tonnes were shipped through East London.

In July, 32,500 tonnes were allocated to Dar es Salaam Port, while East London handled 21,700 tonnes of metal. Dar es Salaam was allocated 28,000 tonnes while 18,200 went through the South African port.

Hauling of the metals from Zambia to Dar es Salaam Port by TAZARA has improved following the acquisition of nine diesel electric locomotive engines from West Germany, the General

Salaam Port, the companies had remained adamant. He also argued that the decision to route the metals through South Africa was unrealistic because it was more expensive than Dar es Salaam.

TANZANIA

SIDO CHAIRMAN PRAISES SWEDEN FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 16 Dec 83 p 3

[Excerpt]

SWEDEN has been praised for its technical assistance which has enabled Tanzania to spread small industries.

Presenting certificates on Wednesday to 34 staff who have served for ten years, SIDO's chairman, Ndugu Chrisant Mzindakaya said had it not been for Sweden's aid, the organisation would not have reached the present success.

"The respect accorded to SIDO by the Swedish experts is never seen in any other sector in the country. We have been able to manufacture a number of products because of this co-operation", Ndugu Mzindakaya said.

Ndugu Mzindakaya also praised workers for their efficiency in the past decade, which he attributed it to proper planning and staff posting.

He said that as from now incentives would be given to workers in order to maintain the efficiency with which the corporation had taken off ten years ago.

Efficient workers would be rewarded. For example, he said Sweden and Japan gave incentives to promote efficiency in their industries.

Ndugu Mzindakaya said authorities should have a broader view of the concept of the human resources development programme.

He pointed out that it would be unfair to concentrate the labour force on agriculture. Part

of it should be deployed in the small industries sector he said.

TANZANIA

NATIONAL, GUYANA NATIONAL SERVICE AGREE ON EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 15 Dec 83 p 3

[Article by Willie Chiwango]

[Text] TANZANIA and Guyana National Service units have agreed in principle to introduce an exchange programme effective next February.

The Director General of the Guyana National Service, Colonel Joseph Govinda Sigh, said in Dar es Salaam on Tuesday that areas of cooperation have been identified and only go-ahead from the respective governments was being awaited.

Col. Singh said his team had been impressed by the five-day tour and learnt a lot which would benefit Guyanese servicemen.

"We feel that through an exchange programme, we shall be able to share our experiences and streamline our activities", he said.

Col. Singh, who held talks with the Chief of National Service (JKT), Major-General Nelson Mkisi in Arusha on Monday, said Tanzania had expressed interest in sending servicemen to Guyana to be trained in graphic designs, steel bank and netball.

JKT is also keen to promote tailoring and shoe-making skills for its factories at Tuvu and Mgulani camps, he said.

Col. Singh said Guyana would send people to Tanzania to study vocational training, personnel management and the system of recruitment and placement of people after National Service training.

Guyana, he added, was also interested in commercialisation of projects so that they were self-supporting and in crop processing and marketing.

He said Guyana had a regular system of sending its people to the Kivukoni Party Ideological College in Dar es Salaam, but it would be the first time to exchange visits at the National Service level.

The Guyanese delegation left yesterday morning for Zambia.

He reaffirmed his country's commitment in the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia.

"We (Guyana and Tanzania) are free, but we still have brothers and sisters in this part of the Continent who are still under the colonial yoke. We still have to help them in the struggle".

Col. Singh drew applause when he said: "This is not a farewell. It may be a goodbye, but we shall see you later either in South Africa or Nambia".

CSO: 3400/454

MINISTRY OFFICIAL SAYS NUWA TO START OFFICIALLY NEXT MONTH

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 19 Dec 83 p 1

[Excerpt]

THE National Urban Water Authority (NUWA) will officially take off next month, the Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Water and Energy, Ndutu Athumani Janguo has said.

Ndugu Janguo disclosed this when he was addressing Dar es Salaam Water Corporation Sole workers from Mtoni, Temeke, Pugu Road, Magomeni, Ilala, Kinondoni, Kawe and Gerezani centres at a meeting held in Dar es Salaam at the weekend.

He said the Authority's take-off had been delayed because of shortage of funds and other technicalities which required, among other things, the dissolution of the Dar es Salaam Water Corporation Sole.

Following the launching of NUWA, some workers would be transferred to the new Authority while others will be sent back to the Ministry, he explained.

He said the World Bank had agreed to assist the Authority in its initial stages and would be sending three experts to be attached to the Authority.

The Authority, which would start operating in Dar es Salaam region first, would

later spread and move to other regional headquarters in the country, he said.

NUWA was established through an Act of Parliament last year in order to co-ordinate short and long-term urban development programmes with the objective of solving water problems in urban areas.

Some of the problems which have been afflicting smooth water supply in urban areas include cumbersome procurement procedures resulting in unnecessary shortage of spares and equipment for water pumping stations.

Others are severe shortage of trained water engineers and absence of proper budgeting for urban water supplies in relation to requirements for basic operation and maintenance.

TANZANIA

PARTY TO PROBE 'MALPRACTICES' IN NASACO, BIT, NDC

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 16 Dec 83 p 1

[Article by Attilio Tagalile]

[Excerpt] The Party has promised to investigate alleged malpractices in the National Shipping Agencies Company (NASACO), the Board of Internal Trade (BIT) and the National Development Corporation (NDC).

The promise was made by the CCM Secretary General, Ndugu Rashidi Kawawa, yesterday when closing a four-month special course at the Kivukoni CCM Ideological College in Dar es Salaam.

Ndugu Kawawa was responding to recommendations made by the 103 graduands who charged that some unscrupulous leaders in NASACO and BIT misused public funds, and property.

Turning to the NDC, the graduands said they were shocked by the Corporation's leaders who they alleged were working out schemes aimed at selling NDC's subsidiary company, the Tanzania Crown Corks, to capitalists.

Calling on the Party to take necessary steps to arrest the situation in the three public institutions, the graduands noted that it was unfortunate that such schemes were taking place at a time when all efforts should be geared toward strengthening public institutions.

The Secretary General promised that the Party would institute investigations into the issue. "You have made serious statements which must be supported by evidence", he said.

CSO: 3400/454

CHINESE TEAM SAYS ENOUGH LOCAL WOOD AVAILABLE TO BUILD PARTY HQ

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 20 Dec 83 p 3

[Text]

CHINESE designers of the proposed Party headquarters complex said yesterday that there is enough local wood to meet the requirements of the project.

The leader of the team, Ndugu Lin Jian Ping told reporters in Liwale town after meeting the CCM Secretary General, Ndugu Rashidi Kawawa, that there was enough hard and soft wood in southern Tanzania for the construction of the complex, *Shihata* reported.

The wood would be used to make doors, windows and floor, he said.

There would be no need for importing marble, gravel and other "decorating materials", Ndugu Lin said.

The experts have visited Mwanza, Arusha, Mtwara and Lindi regions, where they

identified raw materials suitable for the project. They are also studying Tanzania's culture.

Ndugu Lin said the experts were studying culture to be able to design a complex that "reflects the culture of the entire nation."

He said handicrafts made in Mtwara Region would be useful decorations for the inside part of the complex. They also found suitable marble in Ndanda area.

The second phase of designing the complex to house Party head office and parliament building had started, he said.

The project is estimated to cost 600 million/. Work is scheduled to start after the next five years.

CSO: 3400/454

FIRST CONSIGNMENT OF TIRES, TUBES NEEDED TO TRANSPORT FERTILIZER ARRIVES

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 20 Dec 83 p 1

[Excerpt]

THE first consignment of 805 tyres and 185 tubes needed by transporters in the operation to ferry 10,715 tonnes of fertiliser to Songea arrived in Dar es Salaam from Arusha yesterday.

Confirming the reports yesterday, Ministry of Industries sources said the tyres and tubes had arrived in six trucks from the Arusha-based General Tyre Company.

The consignment contains 338 tyres of size 1100 by 20; 469 tyres of size 1200 by 20 and 185 tubes of size 11/1200 by 20.

The reports say the tubes are uniform and could fit in any of the two tyres sizes. This is the first consignment of the much needed tyres.

A meeting of ministers,

Government and relevant parastatal officials, chaired by Prime Minister Edward Sokoine in Dar es Salaam last Thursday decided that 578 tyres and tubes should have been distributed by yesterday.

These would be allocated to trucks belonging to the Zambia-Tanzania Road Services, CORETCO and KAURU which are being mobilised to ferry the fertiliser from the Makambako rail-head to Songea, Ruvuma Region.

It was not immediately known yesterday whether the tyres had been distributed to the transporters. A committee comprising Government and parastatal officials is charged with the responsibility of allocating the tyres and tubes.

The committee consists of officials from the ministries of Agriculture, Industries, and

Industries.

Some private transporters involved in the operation were also issued with tyres and tubes last week by the committee appointed by the Prime Minister's Office.

These include Haideri Roadways, Masumuni Transporter, Ruvuma Distributors, Magomeni Motors, Maleme Transporters, Giga Transporters and Usafirishaji Mkoani Union.

It is understood that the transporters have already begun ferrying the commodity to Songea, but details about the movement of fertiliser were unavailable yesterday.

Communications and Transport as well as the Tanzania Fertiliser Company (TFC), the National Transport Company (NTC), National Chemical Industries (NCI) and the General Tyre Company.

At least 167 trucks are to be mobilised by the Government in the operation which should last between 35 and 40 days.

Officials of the Prime Minister's Office said yesterday that the tyres and tubes aspect of the operation was being co-ordinated by the Ministry of Industries and that TFC was handling the trucks aspects.

The TFC Marketing Manager, Ndugu O. Mollel, said he would issue a report today after clearing the matter with his parent Ministry of

UPPER VOLTA

SANKARA DISCUSSES AIMS OF REVOLUTION

London AFRICA NOW in English No 32, Dec 83 pp 35-36

[Interview with Captain Thomas Sankara, chairman of the National Revolutionary Council by Achim Remde; date and place not specified]

[Text]

■What is the aim of your revolution?

You must understand that dialogue is out of the question nor can there be an appeal to charity when redistributing benefits so far enjoyed only by a minority of Upper Volta's 7m population.

It is this minority which alone had access to education; which controlled the economy, the army, the police and the judiciary; which alone was entitled to health care while the vast majority in the cities and the bush did not even have a modicum of food, housing, education or health care. This was not because they did not work or were lazy, but because the fruits of their labour were confiscated by the minority.

We have to apply other means, what we call the Revolution of August 4, 1983. Our revolution is trying to provide the Voltaic people with solutions to these problems and the assurance that they can be the architects of their own development — a development in accord with the country's means — and that they can and must struggle for their dignity. Basically, this is what our revolution is all about.

■Does that mean you are working towards an egalitarian society?

We are calling for social justice. This is a humanitarian attitude and it implies that the majority of the Voltaic people must no longer suffer from exploitation by a minority whose power-base was buttressed by imperialist powers.

■Will there be no more rich and poor in the society which you want to create?

We are determined to succeed. If we do, Voltaic society will be one in which everyone's *essential* needs will be satisfied. But I stress essential needs and in order to satisfy these, those who had a surplus will have to

share it with those who did not have even the minimum.

You see, there are those among us whose drinking water had to be flown in by air, in bottles. Others, that is between 90-98% of the population, had to walk up to 15km to get water — dirty and polluted at that.

Tomorrow, there will be water — and it won't be polluted, but pure, potable water.

■Capitalist economy and commerce is based on the profit motive — will there be a place in your system for free enterprise?

We are allowing for the existence of free enterprise in our system, provided that the interests of the Voltaic people are respected. This means that the profit which a capitalist wants to make can only be realised if he takes the welfare of the Voltaic people into consideration.

For example, a capitalist can, in the name of free enterprise, promote something which is not morally desirable; with his money he can even impose this on people through a powerful publicity campaign. We don't want that. We want to preserve our independence and safeguard the interests of the people. In certain European countries publicity for tobacco profits is forbidden, but in our country such publicity exists and those who promote it make a profit out of it.

We do not oppose these entrepreneurs who help solve our problems of food self-sufficiency and distribution through their commercial activities. But there will be no more of the jungle law of freedom for profit-making.

■To what extent was your revolution inspired by the Libyan and Ghanaian revolutions?

Our revolution is not inspired by any other revolution. There is a lot of misunderstanding in this respect. Our revolution

was not imported and will not be exported; it is a local product for local consumption. As we understand it, one cannot impose a revolution on people and those who think they can are very much mistaken.

Our revolution was being prepared secretly for a very long time. We studied other revolutions that have taken place elsewhere, as well as reactionary systems in order the better to fight them. We know the Libyan revolution and the revolution in Ghana and we try to learn about other revolutions in the world; we have analysed them. But we have another revolution: one specifically aimed at resolving those contradictions which Voltaic people resent and at seeking solutions arrived at naturally, within the context of our own conditions.

■ What role will Upper Volta play in the division between so-called "moderates" and "progressives" in the OAU?

Our country will not take a position either for the "moderates" or for the "progressives" for the simple reason that these terms have absolutely no significance for us. We do not trust labels or categories such as "moderates" or "progressives."

However, our country certainly will adopt a position in the OAU for such just causes of the people as the struggle for liberation or Africa's economic independence or on behalf of the self-respect of Africans. This is extremely important. It means that we will not automatically vote for a case just because it has been labelled "moderate" or "progressive." The way we will vote will depend on the specific merits of the case and we will base our judgement on what we think will be the practical outcome.

We know of countries which have been called progressive but which have adopted extremely contradictory attitudes. We will judge them on what they do in practice. Our revolution implies that the African peoples should build an effective African unity. But African unity cannot be constructed irrespective of the price. We must not allow the OAU to become an organisation used by imperialism for dominating Africans. It should be an organisation to fight imperialism and to liberate Africa.

■ When President Kountche of Niger visited Ouagadougou last month, did you manage to convince him that Upper Volta is not an example of Libyan expansionism?

I cannot speak for President Kountche. I did explain to him that we are convinced revolutionaries and as such would not consider we were justified in invading another country or in imposing on another people what is our own choice.

What we say is this: wherever there are contradictions such as I have mentioned, these will produce the same reactions. This is a scientific law, beyond our control. From North to South, the exploitation of a majority by a minority causes confrontation. Freedom and dignity is what people need. No people wants to be suppressed; avoid suppression and there is no place for fear. But if it isn't avoided,

there will be fighting from North to South whether you like it or not.

■ In official statements your government has expressed the fear that a foreign invasion is imminent. This is also reflected in stringent security measures. What prompts you to suspect this and from what side do you expect this aggression?

Our revolution has created enemies, both within the country and outside it. All those whose privileges were withdrawn feel resentful and dream of a return to the old system. All those who regarded our country simply as a consumers' market also want to attack us by word or deed now that they realise that we will apply discipline to our economy and give back to our people the opportunity to take advantage of it. This kind of aggression has been seen in similar situations in other parts of the world.

Your question implies that there are people concerned about what happens in Upper Volta. We would be naive to mistake these people's intentions, that they intend to give us gifts. We have already arrested people who were sent into our country to destabilise us. We have discovered plans which were drawn up here with foreigners who lived here and enjoyed our hospitality.

If we have not divulged these things to the Press — and I don't intend giving you the details either — it is only because we don't want to encourage hostility among our own people towards the peoples of those countries whence our enemies were sent. We prefer to take security measures. They will be expelled and sent home. If we were to name those responsible, our countrymen would attack the respective embassy — we don't want that to happen.

■ How are you so sure that the majority of the people supports your revolution? Would you not have to have elections in order to get the people's verdict?

(Laughing) I suggest you go into the streets and test the verdict of the people for yourself. Our experience in elections has been a disappointing one. Democracy can be too easily manipulated.

■ In the past, Upper Volta has been the recipient of international aid. Are you as interested in receiving this aid as previous Voltaic governments?

In the past, aid has been given mainly as a bribe; there was a tacit understanding between aid donor and the recipient government, while the welfare of the Voltaic people was never taken into consideration.

Actually, 20 years of international aid has not brought about any development for our country. You may even be aware that in the past quite a lot of aid found its way into private pockets. We are no longer interested in such practices.

We want our people to help themselves, to be self-reliant. This is the only way our country can develop. People have formed CDRS (*Comités pour la défense de la révolution*) and they work on public projects every Saturday without any remuneration. These are modest projects; nevertheless, they are projects in which the people take part.

If the donor countries and organisations agree with this development strategy of ours, then their aid will be most welcome ●

ZAMBIA

TWO AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 17 Dec 83 p 2

[Text] ZAMBIA and Japan have signed two agreements for a total of K5.3 million under which Zambia will receive rice and fertiliser from Japan.

A Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesman said in Lusaka yesterday Japan would supply K2.9 million worth of rice and spend Il.1 million to airfreight it to Zambia while fertiliser would cost K2.4 million.

The agreements were signed by outgoing Japanese ambassador to Zambia Mr Eiji Seki and Foreign Affairs Minister Professor Lameck Goma at the ministry headquarters.

Japan had included for the first time fertiliser in her annual rice aid to Zambia.

Yesterday's agreements brought to K50.9 million Japanese aid to Zambia since 1981 for the supply of rice, agricultural transport vehicles and machinery, agricultural chemicals, construction of the paediatric surgical centre at Lusaka's University Teaching Hospital and the school of veterinary medicine at the University of Zambia.

From 1973, the total Japanese official loans to Zambia was K202.5 million for projects such as road transport expansion, Zambia Railways expansion, Mass Media Complex and the sulphuric acid plant at Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia in Kafue.

Other projects were a microwave network and the supply of products like fertiliser, railway wagons and trucks.

CSO: 3400/451

ZAMBIA

RECENT PRICE INCREASES ON ESSENTIAL PRODUCTS CONDEMNED

Shapi's Condemnation

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 20 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] COPPERBELT Member of the Central Committee Mr Alex Shapi has condemned the recent price increases on cooking oil and soap announced by Indeco saying the consumer is being pushed against the wall.

Mr Shapi warned that there would be chaos in Zambia if the Party and its Government failed to control the ever rising prices, especially of essential goods while wages and salaries of the workers remained stagnant.

Mr Shapi is the first top Party leader to condemn the price rises. He was speaking to Party leaders from several wards at Ndola's Masala Secondary School hall yesterday.

"At every end and beginning of a new year there come things which confuse the people. The decontrol of prices came last January and now towards the end of the year prices are being increased. This is because we have let increases of prices a free-for-all affair and if left unchecked, it will bring chaos in the country."

He accused parastatal and private company heads of doing things aimed at making the people revolt against the Party and its Government because it was always before or after the national Budget that price increases were announced in a most "wild manner".

He warned that Zambia must take a leaf from governments in other countries which had fallen mainly because of astronomical prices while the people's personal income remained low.

"The Party and its Government should take this prices issue very seriously because it is going to lead to the collapse of the nation. One of the main reasons which has led to the fall of some countries is the higher prices and stagnant wages and salaries. Zambia has been set on the same path," Mr Shapi warned.

He said if what the Sunday Times reported this week was true then he was a "very sad leader" because his understanding was that the Prices and Incomes

Commission was set up to receive price increase recommendations from parastatal companies before these were effected.

"I don't know whether or not our friends in the parastatals are not following this arrangement. If this is the case then we are pushing the people against the wall. NIEC is a parastatal company, it was given the scarce foreign exchange to bring in Somol oil from South Africa yet ROP needed K62 million foreign exchange for raw materials."

He was referring to the Sunday Special which condemned the importation of Somol oil from South Africa which was not selling because it is too expensive and is lying at NIEC warehouses. The Special called on the Party and its Government to get down to the root of the matter to establish how Somol oil was brought in.

The main story in the paper quoted chairman of the Prices and Incomes Commission Dr Leonard Chivuuo as saying his organisation was "toothless" and could not control prices because it was not consulted on such matters.

"There we are. There is nothing we can do because the prices are decontrolled...." Dr Chivuuo said.

Mr Shapi said: "Now the Somol oil which was brought in as a finished product is still at NIEC, it is not selling at K23; and ROP because of lack of foreign exchange to bring in raw materials for it to continue making affordable goods has increased prices since local materials have had their prices increased. These are contradictions which the Party and its Government must address themselves to."

Collapse

He said Somol oil was just one example of many finished goods which were pouring into Zambia while manufacturing companies cried for foreign exchange to bring in raw materials.

"What it is, is that there is foreign exchange for Somol oil and other finished products but there is no foreign exchange for raw materials. So some companies will have to declare workers redundant.

"Parastatals, private companies and marketeers are leading the country to its collapse. All countries that have fallen, the cardinal cause for their collapse has been high prices and low wages which rule the people. If we have been hitherto blind as a Party and Government let us sit down now and find a solution to the serious issue.

"As a Party and Government we must find a way to avoid catastrophe. The Prices and Incomes Commission must not wash their hands of this problem. The commission, the labour movement and the Party and its Government together with parastatal chiefs must put heads together and solve this problem," Mr Shapi said.

CPAZ Seminar's Condemnation

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 21 Dec 83 p 1

[Excerpt] THE Consumer Protective Association of Zambia (CPAZ) has appealed to the Government to re-introduce the price control system on essential goods and services.

The association has urged the Government not to announce any new price increases in the 1984 Budget.

Resolutions released by chairman Mr Ngenda Sipalo at the end of a seminar said the Prices and Incomes Commission must be given more power to approve the fixing of prices before they became effective.

The price control department must be under the Prices and Incomes Commission.

The resolutions said the control of prices had created a lot of problems for the consumer.

"Acknowledging that the present prices of essential commodities are already above the reach of the common man, the seminar strongly suggests that no price increases should be elected in the 1984 national Budget."

The seminar condemned the latest hiking of prices on all ROP products and called on the Government to rescind the decision.

On drugs the seminar felt the Government must see to it that obsolete medicines were not imported into the country.

The Government should ensure that Zambia was not made a dumping ground for dangerous drugs banned in developed countries nor be a testing field.

Highway traffic patrols must be re-introduced to combat, exploitation of passengers by transport operators.

"Those found violating road traffic regulations must be severely punished," the resolutions recommended.

The Government should control taxi fares by introducing charts in each vehicle. Stiff penalties must be meted out for overloading passengers.

Other recommendations were that:

--Adequate compensation should be made to whoever suffered loss or damage through shoddy services. So far the law had been inadequate in that it favoured those who ran the services. The Government should enact a law to protect the consumer.

--Because of shortage of houses which had contributed to the exploitation of tenants, rent charged by private landlords should be controlled by law.

ZCTU Chairman's Statement

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 22 Dec 83 p 1

[Excerpt] THE Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) general council will meet next week to map out a strategy aimed at curbing the current price spiral in the country.

ZCTU chairman, Mr Frederick Chiluba said in Ndola yesterday as far as the congress was concerned it was not whether the Government would increase prices anymore, but it was a question of workers having a united stand against the hardships.

The ZCTU chief, who was commenting on the assertion by the chairman of the Prices and Incomes Commission Dr Leonard Chivuno that market forces would determine the ever-growing imbalance between incomes and prices to introduce a point of equilibrium, said this was a "very unkind Christmas joke".

He disputed the economic argument that market forces in Zambia would ever establish any point in equilibrium.

Mr Chiluba attributed the current imbalances in incomes and prices to Zambia's economic policies which contradicted the practices.

"One begins to wonder whether we have an interplay of free market forces or a controlled socialist command economy because on one hand incomes are not allowed to move freely to counter the movement in prices in order to get to a point of equilibrium.

"Whereas on the other hand the Party and its Government through their parastatals, which in many cases enjoy some kind of monopoly, are unable and unwilling to curb price rises."

The labour chief said he sympathised with Dr Chivauno who had ably chaired the commission and was sincerely seeking to state cold facts.

Mr Chiluba said a lot of damage had already been done and unless workers found a way to unite to overcome the hardships, no answer would be found.

"To us it is not whether the State will increase any more prices, the fight must be based on current economic atrocities and the ACTU general council which sits on December 30 should find an answer to these problems," he added.

CSO: 3400/457

ZAMBIA

MOBIL OIL GIVEN FOREIGN EXCHANGE TO IMPORT SOUTH AFRICAN LPG TANKS

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 16 Dec 83 p 4

[Text]

MOBIL Oil Zambia has been allocated K264,000 foreign exchange by the Bank of Zambia to import four Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) storage tanks from South Africa.

A company spokesman said in Lusaka yesterday the tanks stock large quantities of LPG for converting petrol-driven vehicles into gas propelled ones.

Mobil Zambia, which was carrying out the conversion project in conjunction with Diesel Electric Zambia was waiting for another approval of K500,000 in foreign exchange to bring in 1,000 LPG kits.

Orders of this equipment were for the initial stage of converting 1,000 Government and parastatal vehicles into gas-powered type.

The spokesman said the two public sectors had shown interest in the project adding that already a Government Mechanical Service Department (MSD) Land-Rover and a Volvo car for Zamox were being driven on LPG after being converted from petrol-run.

It was reported last April that over the first eight years projected savings would be

K42 million including about K21 million in reduced oil imports. Savings by the Government transport fleet would be K9,043 and increased corporate tax revenue of K12,166 million.

Initially Mobil would be permitted to implement the first phase only which was the conversion of 1,000 vehicles at a cost of K800 for each vehicle. There was no danger in using gas-powered equipment provided the equipment was installed by approved fitters and refuelling was done at proper filling stations.

Mobil Zambia managing director Mr Drew Stein said then his company had been allocated K500,000 in foreign exchange by the central bank to launch the first phase of the LPG project and was enough to convert at least 1,000 Government, parastatal and private vehicles.

Yesterday the spokesman could not say whether the K264,000 for LPG storage tanks was in addition to the first allocation of K500,000

in foreign exchange but that letters of credit for the tanks had been opened and suppliers informed.

He said the South African manufacturers had started working on the tanks and his company was expecting them in Zambia in three to four months time.

Installed

Two of the LPG tanks would be installed in Lusaka and Ndola and Kitwe would have one each. "As soon as we get the approval to bring in the 1,000 kits then there will be more to talk about," the spokesman said.

Mobil Zambia was fully committed to conserve fuel consumption and to reduce oil import bill.

The spokesman recalled that there was much at Ndola Oil Refinery going to waste and his company was making every effort to make use of it through the launching of the LPG project.

ZAMBIA

ZSC TO OBTAIN SUGAR SELF-SUFFICIENCY UNTIL 1990

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 22 Dec 83 p 5

[Text] ZAMBIA Sugar Company (ZSC) has embarked on a K17 million expansion programme to attain self-sufficiency in sugar until 1990.

Yesterday ZSC signed two loan agreements with the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) for the expansion project.

Other institutions co-financing the project are the Development Bank of Zambia and KFW of West Germany.

ZSC chairman Mr Dixie Zulu signed for them and CDC resident representative in Zambia Mr John Canty signed for his organisation.

Mr Zulu is Indeco managing director under which ZSC falls.

Under the agreement the CDC is giving the company K4 million for the expansions of raw and white sugar facilities.

In the other deal the CDC is providing about K600,000 which is an extension of a previous loan of K1.7 m concluded in 1980 to finance the provision of irrigation water for the Kaleva Smallholders Scheme.

The scheme, which is now operational, aims at putting about 300 smallholders on land around the Nakambala Sugar Estate.

The smallholders should be growing cane with an investment of K20m.

At the signing ceremony Mr Zulu said ZSC was grateful for the assistance and cooperation received from CDC over the years.

He said the CDC was also assisting a number of Indeco subsidiaries like Kafue Textiles, Chilanga Cement and Zamefa.

"In particular we are happy with the speedy and efficient manner in which CDC has progressed our applications for loans. "This has greatly assisted the speedy implementation of the projects," Mr Zulu said.

ZAMBIA

ZCTU EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT SECOND PRICE INCREASE IN ONE YEAR

Lusaka SUNDAY TIMES in English 18 Dec \$3 p 1

[Excerpt] THE Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) has expressed concern over the price increases of essential commodities before the Budget next month.

ZCTU Secretary-General Mr Newstone yesterday that it was disturbing that while workers were in the process of getting relief from the ten per cent salary increase, a second set of price increases had been released within the same year.

Speaking when he officially opened the Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW) annual conference, Mr Zimba said the labour movement was equally against the abolition of student allowances.

"It is a futile exercise to call on the people to sacrifice in order for them to get impoverished and contribute to the stagnation of the economy which directly endangers peace and stability.

"We do not agree with these price increases which have beaten our members below their last breathing bowels. We do not even see the sense of abolishing student allowances", he said.

It was unfair to withdraw student allowances when those for many privileged people in the administrative bureaucracy of the State and enterprises remained untouched.

There were far too many unproductive jobs which did not need a commission of inquiry to be done away with.

CSO: 3400/451

PRICE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN SAYS BODY 'TOOTHLESS'

Lusaka SUNDAY TIMES in English 18 Dec 83 p 1

[Text]

Following the Government's decision to decontrol prices it had become evident that consumers were finding it difficult to afford goods in shops.

Dr Chivuno said this when he addressed a Consumer Protective Association (CPA) seminar at the Ridgeway Campus of the University of Zambia.

He said there were contradictions in Zambia's pricing structure in that while companies were allowed to hike prices of goods, the level of incomes had remained static because of wage controls.

"If you control wages and decontrol prices then it means that the ability that you give to the consumer to finalise the process of production is then curtailed."

The result was that incomes remained stagnant while prices kept on rising.

It was important that after the decontrol of prices the consumer should receive enough income to afford the price of goods.

The present pricing structure was in direct contradiction of the philosophy of Humanism which says that all activities are centred around man.

It had in fact reduced the capacity of workers to meet their needs. Workers were not benefiting from the production process at the moment.

The "fixing" of prices was at present outside the powers of the commission and this had led to a situation where consumers were being exploited.

Not desperate

He could not understand why a bottle of soft drinks which retails at 35n in Lusaka should cost 80n in Mongu.

"There we are. There is nothing that we can do because the prices are decontrolled. I believe the stage we have reached is not desperate and I am sure that the Party and its Government is open to guidance, proposals and advice on the matter."

It was exploitation that soap imported from Zimbabwe at 30n a tablet should retail at K1.10 in Zambia.

"Although we are toothless as a prices and incomes commission we have decided to make serious research into the whole issue."

Research findings would be submitted to the Party for its consideration. Both the Zambia Federation of Employers and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions had indicated their willingness to participate in a number of research projects into prices and incomes policy.

The commission was relatively young and it would take some time before there were changes in its functions and roles.

Outlining the ineffectiveness of the commission, Dr Chivuno told the seminar participants that for instance before the new hikes in the price of soap and cooking oil were announced by Indeco, it had not been consulted.

"The net-effect on the economy of the runaway prices was that there was "contractual production". This meant that overall production of the factories went down in that goods did not move fast on the market since consumers did not have the purchasing power.

Dr Chivuno noted that even capitalist countries such as the United States had a price control mechanism which affected goods which the government felt were of national importance.

In this respect milk producers in the US were not given powers to hike overnight the price of their product without government approval.

Referring to the seminar, Dr Chivuno said it was an important one and that his commission would give serious consideration to its resolutions.

"The role of the Consumer Protective Association is not only to protect its members, but enhance the process of development in the nation to ensure that the consumer participates in the final process of development in the country," said Dr Chivuno.

ZAMBIA

ROP MANAGER DEFENDS COOKING OIL, SOAP PRICE INCREASES

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 19 Dec 83 p 1

[Excerpt] ROP has defended the 42.2 per cent increases in the price of cooking oil saying the product "is still cheap for the Zambian consumer".

ROP general manager Mr Constantine Chimanja said at the weekend on a special Television Zambia interview that the company would have lost K4.6 million if it had not raised retail prices for cooking oil and soap.

The company, an Indeco subsidiary, last week announced that a five-litre tin of cooking oil would cost K14.15 from K9.85.

The move had sparked off protests from several quarters including the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which has warned the Government to brace itself for tougher action from the labour movement.

Speaking on Television Zambia, Mr Chimanja said the increased were justified in that ROP last hiked the price of its products in 1980 while production costs has excalated.

The company had been going into "deep waters" financially and had been waiting for a Government go-ahead to increase the prices as early as 1981.

"The company would not go with the old prices and as a company we have to survive," said Mr Chimanja during the interview on which he appeared with Indeco director for personnel and public relations Mr Michael Mulenga.

The cost of ingredients used by the company in the manufacture of its products including oil seeds had risen sharply.

Mr Chimanja cited cotton which he said cost K150 a tonne last year and was now fetching K240 a tonne.

There was a specific problem of sunflower seed which is ungraded and 25 per cent of the quantity bought by ROP had to be thrown away.

The price of sunflower seed had also shot up from K387 a tonne in 1981 to K630 a tonne this year.

ROP was undergoing severe financial problems and the company had only been salvaged after the Government agreed to increase its capitalisation and Zimco had increased its equity holding into the firm.

He said ROP management was doing its best to save costs.

Reviewing company operations, Mr Chimanja said these had been adversely affected by the lack of foreign exchange over the past 60 months.

While ROP foreign exchange annual requirement was K62 million, the company had during the past five years been allocated only K18 million. Last year the company was given K5.7 million for the whole year.

Asked how the company had arrived at the new prices, Mr Chimanja said it had taken into account the production costs and expenses.

He denied that the company had manipulated figures to justify the rises. ROP was "sensitive" to increasing prices and he said the company would do everything to ensure that there were no further increases over the next 12 months.

Mr Mulenga described as air the new prices of commodities and said there was no running away from the fact that consumers should pay them. It was a reality which they should face.

CSO: 3400/451

ZAMBIA

MFC DEFENDS IMPORTATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN COOKING OIL

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 22 Dec 83 p 2

[Text]

THE National Import and Export Corporation (NIEC) has exonerated itself from blame over the controversial importation of the K23.70 South African cooking oil saying the decision was blessed by the Government and the Bank of Zambia.

Reacting to an article in the Sunday Times, acting managing director Mr Clement Mambwe said following local manufacturing capacity problems, his firm was asked to import the oil to offset the shortfall.

"We needed to import this cooking oil and other detergents to ensure continued supply. We therefore contributed to the peace and stability now prevailing."

Cataloguing reasons why the oil was retailing at K23.70 Mr Mambwe said a number of external factors among them this year's decision to devalue the Kwacha by as much as 30 per cent had necessitated the high price.

"Devaluation and floating of the Kwacha added as much as K5.11 for each imported can."

Other reasons included the removal of subsidies on cooking oil announced in the last Budget which meant that NIEC had to pay K3.69 as

customs duty for each can imported.

Although South Africa was still by far Zambia's cheapest source of essentials, production costs there had risen by more than 60 per cent compared to the previous year, he said.

In addition to other expenses like bank charges, insurance and levy to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for import licences, the retail price of South African cooking oil should have been about K25.80 "and NIEC has not actually increased the price but has reduced it," said Mr Mambwe.

Denying insinuations that some NIEC officials had received "kickbacks" from the Somol cooking oil deal as stated in the "Sunday Special" column this week, he said:

"There was nothing like kickbacks because NIEC imports goods by tender. The buying committee comprises six senior officials drawn from some of the nine firms in the group."

CSO: 3400/457

MUZ DEMANDS MINERS' CONTRIBUTION FIGURES TO NPF 1966-1973

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 17 Dec 83 p 1

[Excerpt]

THE Mineworkers Union of Zambia has given Zambia National Provident Fund a seven-day ultimatum to come up with figures of contributions worth millions of Kwacha paid by miners between 1966 and 1973 or MUZ would take appropriate action.

MUZ chairman Mr Timothy Walamba warned yesterday that the matter was serious. Miners should not be blamed when the situation got out of hand.

Addressing a Press conference in Kitwe, Mr Walamba also expressed concern at the deteriorating safety conditions in the mining industry. The appointment of an expatriate safety manager had worsened the situation, he said.

MUZ was concerned about ZNPF contributions because the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) could only show figures on miners' pay statements from 1973 to 1983.

The system of paying ZNPF contributions started in 1966 and all mineworkers who have been working for the mining company were still paying

through their divisions.

MUZ expected ZNPF to have forwarded the information to ZCCM so that the company would show the amounts on pay statements from 1966.

"But unfortunately, we have been told that they have got no figures from ZCCM from 1966 to 1973. We have tried to appeal to our colleagues at Copper Industry Services Bureau to inform whoever is responsible from ZNPF to come and explain why they do not have the figures."

There was always a negative answer from ZNPF. "It seems they do not see the seriousness of this case. I am giving ZNPF seven days with immediate effect to come up with figures of all the employees who started contributing towards the fund from 1966 to 1973."

MUZ had tried all possible means to invite the ZNPF to a meeting for the past two months. "The answer we have received is that we will come and up to now nobody has managed to come for an audience with us."

CSO: 3400/451

ZAMBIA

SENANGA OFFICIALS TO RESUME RELIEF TO FAMINE-STRICKEN AREAS

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 20 Dec 83 p 2

[Text]

SENANGA district council officials have been directed to resume the delivery of relief supplies to famine-stricken villages surrounding Liasa depot which was temporarily closed down following the kidnapping of the watchman by rebel UNITA forces two months ago.

Speaking after inspecting the abandoned depot 19 km northwest of Shangombo sub-boma Western Province assistant secretary Mr Chresta Kaluba advised the council officials to introduce direct mobile distribution of food supplies to the villagers to avoid further disruption of such services by the rebel UNITA forces.

Earlier police officer in-charge of Shangombo, Mr Polycap Busiku informed Mr Kaluba that the watchman Mr James Kakundu, was captured on the night of October 15 together with Mr Mwikisa Mushe, a relief

recorder and his wife Monica.

He said that although Mr Mushe and his wife were released eight days later from Angolan territory, the watchman was still in the hands of the rebels.

Mr Busiku explained that before their release, Mr Mushe and his wife were tortured by the rebels who wanted to know the movements of famine relief trucks carrying food to the depot.

He said that the rebels wanted to know whether the relief trucks were escorted by security vehicles when delivering the food.

In Kabwe, the Central Province Member of the Central Committee's office is

mobilising vehicles to deliver bags of mealie meal to hunger-stricken Luano valley in Mkushi district before the roads become impassable.

The province's acting permanent secretary Mr Wamundila Mukelabai who disclosed this in Kabwe yesterday said a total of 1,621 bags were between August and September this year delivered to the starving villagers in Luano valley.

Mr Mukelabai revealed that Senior Chief Mboroma had written to him that more mealie meal was needed in the area as the first consignment had been consumed.

The permanent secretary said similar requests had been received from other chiefs.—Zana.

CSO; 3400/457

LAND DISPUTE CAUSES MOB ATTACK ON THREE VILLAGES

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 16 Dec 83 p 1

[Text]

EIGHT people have been admitted to the Lusaka University Teaching Hospital after three villages were attacked by a mob over a land dispute.

The attackers went on an orgy of destruction at Susman resettlement east of Lusaka on Monday.

Terrified men, women and children took to the bush and fear returning to their homes because the raiders from other villages had vowed they would burn their shacks.

Police have now stationed a platoon in the area to maintain law and order.

Lusaka Province police chief Mr Geoffrey Mukuma said yesterday a "number of people" had been picked up for questioning. "Some will be charged with assault and others with malicious damage to property."

Mr Mukuma confirmed that at least eight people had been admitted to UTH after the attack.

Villagers in the affected areas reported that after destroying their property some of the raiders looted their houses grabbing anything they could lay their hands on.

The reason for the fight was land.

The incident started last Friday when a man from a nearby village crossed into the Susman resettlement and started sowing seeds in a garden that was allegedly not his.

Some youths beat him up and ordered him off the land.

When his people heard what had happened, they mobilised themselves into a small army ready to attack those on the resettlement, said Mr Harrison Zambara from Kapapi village.

Mr Peter Mwemba from the same village said the mob accompanied by women and children singing war songs pursued him into the bush, caught him and brought him to his house for "some beating".

CSO: 3400/451

ZAMBIA

BRIEFS

NETHERLANDS WAIVES INTEREST ON LOANS--THE NETHERLANDS government has waived nearly K900,000 interest and instalments on development loans for Zambia due in 1983. Netherlands charge d'affaires, Mr R. J. van Houtum told the Minister of Finance, Mr Luke Mwananshiku in Lusaka yesterday that his government had decided to waive interest and instalments on development loans for a number of developing countries. He said the decision to waive Zambia's interest and instalments on development loans falling due in 1983 had been taken in the framework of the Dutch policy to alleviate the indebtedness of developing countries. [Excerpt] [Lusaka DAILY MAIL in English 16 Dec 83 p 5]

TRACTOR SPARE PARTS ORDERED--THE GOVERNMENT has ordered more spare parts to rehabilitate grounded tractors and other types of agricultural machinery, Parliament was told yesterday. Minister of State for Agriculture and Water Development Mr Daniel Munkombwe, said although some spare parts were recently acquired, there were plans to bring in more so that machinery which was now immobile could be made operational. Mr Munkombwe's assurance came in the wake of grave concern expressed by many backbenchers who highlighted the lack of spare parts and its adverse effects on the agricultural industry. [Excerpt] [Lusaka DAILY MAIL in English 16 Dec 83 p 1]

AFC THREATENS TO STOP LOANS--ABOUT 300 farmers in Mwinilunga district owe the Agricultural Finance Company (AFC) nearly K96,000 with some of them failing to clear their debts over a period of 12 years. The district's council minutes released in Kitwe say the farmers owe the AFC a total of K95,971.83 to date. As a result, the AFC has threatened to stop giving out loans to farmers in the district until this money has been repaid. "If the outstanding amount was not paid, it could be difficult for the company to give more seasonal or medium term loans to farmers." Apart from non-payment of loans, some of the farmers had failed to utilise their allocations. The Government had allocated K144,000 through the AFC for the district, but it was feared that most of this amount might not be fully utilised which would result in the allocation being withdrawn completely or considerably reduced. [Excerpt] [Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 19 Dec 83 p 2]

CSO: 3400/451

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